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THE

COMMERCE, RESOURCES,

AND

PROSPECTS OF INDIA.

BY

MACLEOD WYLIE, ESQ.

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PREFACE.

THE preparation of the following paper was suggested by a friend in England, on the perusal of a letter which appeared in the *Church Missionary Intelligencer* of last December. It was commenced before any expectation had arisen of a mutiny in the Bengal Army, and it was nearly finished prior to the outbreak of the present extraordinary insurrection. In revising it, and carrying it through the press, it was not thought desirable to advert to this strange revolution. The paper, therefore, indicates the position we appeared to have attained a few months ago, and the prospects which then opened before us.

Viewed from the lowest point, the present extensive disturbances must cause an immense loss to the revenue, and a serious check to trade; but the other consequences will be much more important. For a long period there will be a great amount of social disorganization; there must be a complete remodelling of the native army; the European force must be so strengthened, as to afford security to our countrymen in every station, and to maintain with vigour, and in undisputed supremacy, the British authority throughout the Empire.

Experience has taught us that the political as well as the religious spirit of Mahomedanism survives in India, in all its active unmitigated hostility to Christianity, and the British rule; and that the system of truckling to Caste among the Hindus, while it perpetuates an anti-social anomaly, affords no guarantee for gratitude or fidelity. If, in restoring the British authority, the old system is to be followed, and we are to place confidence in plans for conciliating religious prejudices, which, in their nature, are opposed either to our supremacy or to the progress of civilization, we may count on another disappointment. The opportunity is now afforded of dis-

tinguishing plainly between toleration and patronage. In Runjeet Sing's reign the Mussulmans were proscribed in the Punjaub; under the King of Oude, no Hindu dared to erect a temple in Lucknow; but under the British Government the amplest toleration has all along been afforded to both, and ought still to be afforded. We may allow them to erect and endow their shrines and temples; we may permit their public calls to prayer, their pilgrimages, and their festivals; but we need not imitate the spirit of our early British rulers, and pander to superstitions which we know to be hostile to the interests of the people, and which are ordinarily based on palpably absurd traditions. It is our duty to enlighten the people; and just as we teach them that this earth does not rest on the back of a tortoise, and that all their geography is false, we may also teach them that it is not the fact, that God in the beginning created four distinct races of men, among whom the first class, the Brahmins, are divine. It is contrary to the spirit of British jurisprudence to recognize the system of Caste, which rests on this ridiculous theory of the creation of man; and if we seek to perpetuate our military system on the basis of such a recognition, we must be content with soldiers who will naturally be the prey of every other delusion, and whose stereotyped ignorance and superstition will increasingly be a source of weakness and anxiety.

That the British dominion in India will be maintained and strengthened, few will doubt, who have traced the wonderful manner in which the providence of God has hitherto been employed to overcome obstacles, and to facilitate progress; and that it will be maintained for the good of India, and the good of Asia, none will doubt, who anticipate, through British influence, the establishment of Christianity. The present wild movement probably will hasten that result, first by developing the real spirit and the utmost force of Mahommedanism, and then by leading to its violent overthrow and its humiliation. The great want of India, under present circumstances, is a Government of enlightened views, of energy, and of

vigour, capable of extinguishing the last embers of disaffection ; diffusing, in the administration of public affairs, the spirit of British justice ; and identifying British authority, not as formerly with Caste and other follies and superstitions, but with mental and moral enlightenment.

There is no occasion for submission to native prejudices. The oriental mind never will respect a Government that humours it. In every Eastern country, the first condition of peace must be the thorough subjugation of the people and their consciousness of the power of their rulers ; following this, but never preceding it, will come their appreciation of benefits and indulgence. They do not understand self-government. In their homes they cling still to patriarchal arrangements, and their instinct requires an object of reverence in their ruler. Like children they will abuse freedom, and as all history and experience shew, they can understand nothing but paternal government. The course of many years will be needed to fit them for any other system, and in that interval, any relaxation of wise restraint will be treated as weakness, and rewarded by disaffection.

The task that lies before England, is not the establishment of a military despotism. A strong Government, with a determinate policy and with recognized power, is a very different thing. It is right that we should remodel and strengthen our army, rendering it efficient, and adequate to all the wants of the country ; but after all, this army must be only a means to an end :—an instrument for maintaining the public tranquillity, and enabling Government to give effect to its designs for the improvement of the people, and the development of the resources of the country. The army cannot enlighten ; it cannot create a spirit of commercial enterprise ; it cannot direct into the most useful career the mental activity of the people. Government must take the lead in all this in India, and the army must be the servant of the state, and not its dictator, or the consumer of its strength and vitality. The whole of the

policy, therefore, which is indicated in the following pages, may be still pursued, and should be pursued with energy and ardour. We need enquiry ; we need increased attention from the British legislature ; and we need an alteration of the form of Government. The system of Double Government and Divided Responsibility, and the neglect of India by the British Parliament, have manifested their fruits. We need a new system, and a new policy, and as the basis of all, the enlightenment of public opinion in Great Britain, *by a searching enquiry into the condition of each Presidency and the working of each department of Indian Government.*

But if this policy is to be pursued, the freedom of the European Press in India will be as necessary as Commissions of Enquiry. The information on which the legislature and people of England act, must not be derived solely from official channels, and from Indian newspapers in which free discussion is prohibited and even the news of the day must be recorded without comment. The freedom of the native press has been abused, and may, justly for a season at least, be suspended ; though it may well be doubted, if a better measure of precaution would not be a law for the summary punishment of the publication and distribution of seditious writings. But it is not probable that the recent act of the Legislative Council, passed without notice and without deliberation, for the virtual destruction of the freedom of the European Press in India, will be sanctioned by the British Parliament. For it is on that Press alone, that dependence can be placed for adequate discussions of the measures of the Indian Government. The British Press must, in the nature of the case, draw not only its narratives of facts, but also its information respecting the tendency of public measures, and the light in which intelligent and experienced men in India regard them, from the Indian periodicals. Certainly nothing has recently occurred which proves that the European Press in India is behind the Government in its appreciation of the true condition of public affairs, or in the wisdom of its propositions for current emer-

gencies. On the contrary, it is evident that the public press as the true exponent of public opinion, indicated long before the Government was roused to vigorous action, the existence of grounds for grave apprehensions, and advocated energetic measures for quelling the spirit of disaffection, when the Council was hesitating or applying insufficient remedies, and the Commander-in-Chief was wasting time in the hills. And when at length the threatened storm burst, the European Press, still faithful to public opinion, at once strengthened the Executive Government, by cordial and unanimous support. It seems strange, indeed, therefore, that this time should have been chosen for imposing shackles on that Press, and depriving alike the Press of Great Britain of its faithful guidance and co-operation, and the Government itself of its powerful sympathy and succour.

The subjects to which the attention of the British Legislature must now primarily be drawn, are first, this Act of needless oppression; secondly, the condition of the Indian finances; and thirdly, the supply of adequate military forces for the re-establishment of British authority. Under the Charter Act of 1853, the Court of Directors can disallow this hasty measure of the Legislative Council, and probably under the influence of the British Government, Parliament and Press, they may do so. With respect to the finances, it will be necessary to adopt measures without delay. With such heavy losses to the revenue, and such extraordinary expenses, the Indian Government will require speedy relief and assistance. As to our military arrangements, there is too much reason to fear, that the ease with which our European troops have overcome the Sepoys when fairly confronted with them, will lead to the despatch of inadequate forces. But it must be remembered that we have a vast extent of country to re-occupy; that every single station will require (for the establishment of security) some European force; that the whole work of subduing the country has to be accomplished in the cold weather campaign, unless we are prepared for an immense

sacrifice of life by protracting operations till the hot weather ; that one object to be kept in view is the *demonstration* of overwhelming forces and resources, for the effectual conviction of the native mind ; that much will depend on the complete, comprehensive, simultaneous action of our troops in a variety of places, at the same time, so as to re-establish the prestige of the British power ; and that large, bold, energetic movements, in the gradual preparation and accumulation of forces, and the resolute application of our strength to the work of the campaign, will probably permanently establish British authority, and destroy for ever all hopes of resistance within our own frontier, and all inclination to disturb us among our surrounding foes. We may restore tranquillity with small forces, and create the appearance of peace. But something more is wanted, if India is henceforth to pursue a career of social advancement and prosperity ; and if there is now to be a final end of public disturbances and of spasmodic efforts to overturn our authority.

Of ulterior measures, the first will be the completion of new military arrangements, including a large permanent augmentation of our European forces, and the remodelling of the army, on the principle of mixing up the men of different races, creeds, and castes, and securing the efficiency of our staff and our regimental officers. The open disaffection of some native chiefs may also render necessary the annexation of further territory.

And when order is restored, the time will arrive for testing the firmness and the wisdom of Great Britain. It will be easy to delegate authority ; it will be easy to let things take their course ; but the interests of tens of millions are at stake ; and the conscience of the State must be aroused to a sense of duty. Earnest, resolute, and enlightened men are needed to review the past, and to discern the future. A new policy is required ; the true Mission of our country has to be acknowledged ; and our highest, primary obligation, so long and so lamentably neglected, has to be recognized and dis-

charged. To Great Britain is entrusted the most honorable of all guardianships, and on her faithfulness, courage, and judgment depend (under the blessing of God) the peace, the progress, and the happiness of this splendid empire. Experience has proved that a Government, by a slow-moving monopoly, conducted on the principle of subserviency to superstition, and animated most of all by jealousy of its cherished patronage, and unchecked by public opinion, (for such, in the main, has been the Government of the East India Company), is not worthy of the British name. Terrible events have been needed to teach that lesson, but they certainly do seem effectually to have taught it at last. Now comes the time for reconstruction ; for a wiser system, and a broader policy, suited to the prospects of India.

May the King of Nations, the Gracious God, who has given this trust to Great Britain, give the wisdom to discharge it to His glory, and to the good of the myriads entrusted to her sway !

Calcutta, July 6, 1857.

COMMERCE, RESOURCES, AND PROSPECTS OF INDIA.

[RE-PRINTED FROM THE CALCUTTA REVIEW, NO. LVI.]

1. *Parliamentary Papers from 1776.*
2. *Selections from the Records of the Government of India, and the Governments of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the North West Provinces, and the Punjab.*
3. *Reports of Administration of the Government of India, and the Subordinate Governments, (1857.)*
4. *Reports of External Commerce ; Bengal, Madras, Bombay and Straits Settlements.*
5. *Bell's Review of External Commerce of Bengal, 1830.*
6. *Bell's, Wilkinson's, and Bonnaud's Annual Views (or Commercial Annals), 1833 to 1856.*
7. *Mackay's Western India.*
8. *Journal of the Agricultural Society of Bengal.*
9. *Royle on the Cultivation of Cotton in India ; and on the Fibrous Plants of India.*
10. *Colonel Baird Smith's Reports on the Cauvery, Kistnah and Godavery.*
11. *Colonel Cotton on Public Works in India.*

IF we could conceive a wise and benevolent stranger visiting this earth, and with comprehensive faculties surveying and considering the position and the relations of its various wide dominions, we might suppose him chiefly engaged with that small Island whose authority reaches from the rising to the setting sun, and from which radiates universally the influence of freedom, of commerce, and of Christian Missions. And in all her history and all her present power, one thing, above all, would command his attention. He would see her as the mistress of India : of India in all the vastness of wealth and population,—of India as her conquered but neglected empire : India, her glory and her shame.

It would not be difficult to show that all our colonies, however poor and however distant, have received more favor and more attention than India. From every colony settlers have returned to advocate its special interest ; for every colony a constitution

reason to believe the stories about torture, which were denied at home; if we knew that, except in the case of the Ganges Canal and the works in the Punjab, the extensive public works prior to 1854, were simply repairs of jails, court houses, and public offices; if we suspected that the large balances declared to be in the hands of the Government were unsubstantial; if we knew that money, which was wanted in India, was kept at home, to an extent far beyond any probable (we might perhaps say, possible) wants of the Home Authorities; and if we looked round in vain for an energy, earnestness, and public spirit, corresponding with that which was rapidly elevating our native land.

But, further, we now think it strange that, when in 1852, after a lapse of twenty years, the enquiry into Indian affairs was renewed, it was conducted in such an inferior and perfunctory manner, and that conclusions were reached on imperfect information, obtained almost entirely from official and one-sided witnesses, without any enquiry in India, and without any evidence from natives of the country. We are surprised that, when twenty years had expired, there was not some careful investigation and comparison instituted, to exhibit the expectations excited in 1832, the plans then formed, and the subsequent results. For we believe that there is really room for doubt on many points which appear to be commonly taken for granted. We in Bengal, and our fellow subjects in Madras, know well that all is *not* peace, contentment and prosperity. We are cognizant of notorious evils of great and momentous importance—evils long recognized but unremoved. We know how the work of education was extolled, when, in fact, it reached only a few thousands of the upper classes, pampered them with an effeminate feast of trifling literature, and turned them into a race of selfish, noisy, disaffected infidels. We know that poverty, like an armed man, has been stealing over the fertile territory, alike of Madras and Bengal; we know here of Rent-laws and Sale-laws, which probably constitute the most oppressive fiscal laws in the statute book of any nation; we know of unprotected tenures, and of cultivators *en masse* in the power of landlords who, without restraint, can tax them at their pleasure, and who, by law, are authorized to ‘compel their attendance.’ We know of this oppressive system, and of the energies of the people wasting under it; and we know that between 1824 and 1852 no attempt had been made to relieve the evil. We believe that the cultivators have been sinking lower in temporal circumstances and in mental depression. We know that Bengal was practically ungoverned; and we might well think it strange that the proposition to give it a separate governor should be opposed by the Court of Directors, on the narrow ground of its effect on the patronage of the Governor General. We know, too, that

while Public Works, and in particular, Railways, were proposed in 1830, nothing was done till 1850, after Lord Dalhousie had fairly grappled with the subject, and that it will probably be 1862—thirty years from 1832,—before we have the trunk line complete to Delhi. We know, as to Calcutta, the great reservoir of Indian trade, that it had, and has still, only one inadequate canal for the access of all its hundreds of thousands of tons of inland produce. We know that great parts of the country in that year 1852, were as little known and were as little accessible as the island of Ceylon. We heard of no effective and large-hearted measures to improve the condition of the people; all was as cold and slow as the seniority system. Lord Dalhousie, with a mind capable of effecting great things, was (like all who have been Governors General) absorbed by the general interests of the State; and could not give himself to the details of this Presidency. On him pressed the burden of two wars, the settlement and pacification of the Punjab, the annexation of Nagpore, Pegu, and Oude, the Railways, the Postal system, the Electric Telegraph, our relations with the Nizam; and our Finances. We were out of the scope of imperial policy, and the Parliament and people of England left us thus unregarded and neglected, in a course of moral and social deterioration, in the bitterness of suffering and wrong.

We speak the words, not of passion, but of truth and soberness. Is it a light thing that a great and populous country should have an ineffective and oppressive police, and an administration of justice which is admitted to be little better than a mockery and a lottery; that landlords have usurped jurisdiction and arbitrary power in tribunals of their own; and that such venality and perjury are engendered throughout the country by the regular courts, as would suffice in a few years to corrupt the noblest people on earth? Is it a light matter, that these things should go on unchecked, unimproved, year after year, decade after decade, and that all reform should be made subservient to the maintenance of monopoly, of patronage, and the perpetuation of a system of which exclusiveness is the root and fruit? And may not the voice of sympathy and compassion for suffering thousands, be uttered in these circumstances, without the imputation of passion? We have here in India a record to look back upon, which should rather shame into silence, those who, in England and India, have had the responsibility of the government. It is needless to dwell on the dark early history of notorious and unscrupulous corruption. The House of Commons did its duty then, in exposure—and such an exposure it was, as probably could not be exceeded, if there had been a commission of enquiry into the gains of Turkish Pachas. But more orderly times succeeded. Then Lord Wellesley came to India,

and such was the tone of public sentiment, that Dr. Buchanan had to inform him, that up to that time, there had never been divine service at Barrackpore or at any other station. Then soon followed the days of opposition to Christian Missions, and to the Resolution passed by the House of Commons in 1793. Carey and his companions were warned to leave the country: Judson and his associates were banished from India. By the pilgrim tax; by the grants to heathen temples; by the superintendence of Hindu Trusts, (pronounced to be "endowments for pious and beneficial purposes") Hinduism was propped up at a time when there is good reason to believe that it was languishing. In seasons of drought the aid of the Brahmans was sought, (even not long ago,) to pray for rain; there was public worship, at the expense of government, to seek a profit on the trade in salt and opium; in the work of education the government taught the religious and philosophical errors of Hinduism and Mahommedanism. Trade was hampered by the obstinate retention of internal Transit-duties. The Government insisted on maintaining its losing trade with India and its losing trade with China, paying the losses into the hands of ship-owning proprietors at home out of the revenues of India. There were obstacles to the settlement of Europeans in India; objections to the suppression of Sati; protests against the freedom of the press. There were many years with great vigilance in exacting the land tax, and no single measure of enlarged benevolence. Old Indians became types, in works of fiction, and on the public stage, of prejudice, selfishness and folly.

We ask in vain, why India was thus neglected by the English nation? Let it be observed that there was every thing to encourage interference. There has oftentimes been an outcry against this or that proposition made in the British Parliament; but it is important to remember, that it is extremely difficult to mention a single case in which the interference of the British Legislature has not been a positive, important, and substantial benefit to India. The early efforts of Burke and Dundas to bring the government into order, and to put down corruption, as well as the previous establishment of the Supreme Court, may have been made (were indeed necessarily based) on imperfect information; but no one pretends that they were not great and useful reforms. Even the impeachment of Hastings had its legitimate basis, and was fully as much a debt due to justice as was his subsequent acquittal. The spirit of the enquiry and of the charter in 1793, is best illustrated by the resolution already quoted. Then in 1813, the trade with India was thrown open, the impulse was given to education, and the barriers to missionary efforts were removed. In 1833, the Agra Presidency was established, the Supreme Council

received legislative powers, the Law Commission was issued, the China trade was thrown open, and the offices of government in India were opened to the people. In 1853, the Legislative Council (as the first instalment of representative Government) was established, yearly reports of administration were required from each Presidency, the new system of education was established, public works were taken up in earnest, and above all, (as the certain root of extensive and incalculable improvement in the future spirit of the government) the Civil Service was opened to public competition. And now, if we are looking for a real reform of the judicial system, we owe it to the Law Commission appointed by the Crown in 1853 to give effect to the reports of the Law Commission of 1833, and to the discussions in Parliament which have impelled the Home Government to insist on the new Code of Procedure being embodied in a law.

In other matters, Home influence has been equally important and powerful. It was by home influence, that Lord Glenelg's dispatch was obtained, ordering the severance of the connection of Government with idolatry. Recently it was home influence which urged the attention of Government to the subject of torture; and it is home influence which has tended most to regulate and stimulate the Government of India in all that it has attempted to develop the resources of the country.

It is to this home influence, the power of English public opinion, and the authority of the British Legislature, that we look now for further changes; and without this influence, we have little hope of speedy or satisfactory reforms. For, past delays have not arisen from uncertainty as to the principal measures required. So far back as 1832 we find Mr. Holt Mackenzie thus stating his views in reply to questions from the Board of Control, and those views reported to the House of Commons.

"Looking forward to no very distant time in the history of a nation, we might, I think, increase the wealth of the country, or secure a better distribution of it, and consequently raise more revenue, if wanted, by all or some of the following measures. By a settlement of the amount to be paid by the owners of the land, for a long term of years, the assessment being so adjusted as to leave them a valuable property in the surplus rent beyond the Government demand, and *with a survey and record, such as to remove all doubt with regard to the subject matter of the settlement; by encouraging the settlement of Europeans, and the children of Europeans, and the application of their energy, skill, and capital to agriculture; by educating the natives to European knowledge and habits; by admitting natives to a larger share in the advantages of office; by constant, but gradually urged efforts to give a more popular character to the administration of the country; by a liberal, but economical, and strictly watched expendi-*

ture in facilitating internal intercourse; by removing all artificial impediments to the extension of trade in India, or between England and India; by abolishing the usury law in India, and providing generally a good system of mercantile law, and courts to administer it promptly and cheaply."

So again :—

"The salaries of officers to be regulated by the work to be done, without reference to individuals or classes employed, further than is necessary, with the view of having good work, including in the term, as respects civil government, the maintenance and security of the sovereignty of England; the consequent employment of native agency more and more extensively, with liberal, though (to Europeans comparatively) moderate allowances; the restriction of high-paid European functionaries (I include all judges, magistrates, and collectors of districts) to matters necessarily requiring their interference; *the full recognition of the absurdity of attempting to administer the affairs of a million of civilized men by the direct agency of one or two individuals, and those foreigners*; and the practical application of the principle that we cannot really have a civil government, excepting through the co-operation of the people; the gradual exclusion of servants temporarily deputed from England, from all functions not necessarily confided to them with the view of maintaining the sovereignty of England; the more general employment of individuals in place of collective bodies; the immediate exemption of the local governments, especially the Supreme Government, from responsibility for matters of detail which they cannot usefully, and do not actually administer; the clear definition of the responsibilities actually belonging to all classes of public functionaries; the appointment of a Governor General and Council for all India, with powers and duties so defined as to make him such in reality, not in name; the union of the armies of the three Presidencies under one head; the transfer of the whole to the crown; the substitution of a part of the royal navy for the Bombay marine or the Indian navy; the better regulation of the supply of stores required by the Indian Governments; a stricter check upon expenditure in public works; the better definition of the powers of Direction as distinguished from those of Control; the exclusion of the controlling authorities from all patronage, direct or indirect.

"I should suppose it likely that the purposes of economy would be promoted by the employment of the ordnance and other national establishments, in all business connected with the Indian army, which has to be done in England in their several departments. The island of Ceylon ought, I should think, to be part of the Indian Government; St. Helena should be a national concern; and of course the revenues, taken from the people of India in virtue of our national sovereignty, should be regarded as belonging to the public purse of England, so that every saving in our territorial charges may be considered a national saving; and every waste of our territorial resources, a waste of public money."

Let these words be weighed ; let the evidence on steam navigation, and on railways, be considered ; let the appointment of the law commission be borne in mind, and then let it be considered what was the prospect in 1833, and what, in contrast, was actually accomplished by 1853. Mr. Mackenzie's plans had nothing in them speculative, impracticable, or disturbing to the position of the East India Company. They simply embraced, together with the maintenance of the Court of Directors and its patronage, the advancement of the people in their social and material interests, and the simplification of the plan of local government. He wanted a fair apportionment of salary to labour ; the abolition, as far as possible, of civil and social disabilities ; the employment of an adequate number of public servants ; the separation of distinct functions ; the clear definition of responsibility ; cheap courts of justice ; public works ; and a series of other measures which have only been partially conceded up to the present time, or remain altogether still in prospect. On this point we have the remarkable evidence of the petition presented in 1853, from the British and other Christian inhabitants of Calcutta and other parts of Bengal. They say :—

“ Although the Government was furnished by the Charter Act (of 1833) with new powers and machinery to effect what then appeared, and whatever in future might appear, desirable, many of the intentions of Parliament remain neglected: thus, for example, no means have been taken to form for India, a properly qualified body of judges, or to open the judicial service to qualified persons, though the want was demonstrated by a large body of evidence before Committees of the Houses of Parliament. The criminal laws of the East India Company's Courts, in their application to natives, were condemned, fifteen years ago, by the Indian Law Commission, which was appointed under a direction of the Charter Act, to inquire into the state of the laws ; but the criminal laws remain for the most part unchanged. In a spirit generally deemed as impolitic as illiberal, the Government has repeatedly proposed to bring British subjects under those laws, though so declared unjust toward the natives who were accustomed to them. The want, in the East India Company's Courts, of Laws adapted to the requirements of trade and commerce, is well known ; the English law could furnish an equitable commercial code, but English law is excluded from these courts, and no other rational system has been enjoined upon or adopted by them, although the Charter Act expressly directs the preparation of laws adapted to all classes of the public. The great want, in the courts of the East India Company, of a body of laws both civil and criminal, for the East Indians, to whom as Christians the native laws were not justly applicable, was specially brought under the consideration of Parliament, and the peculiar hardship of the case drew forth the sympathy of several eminent men. Practical

relief has been proposed to government by the Indian Law Commission under the name of a *Lex Loci Act*, but relief has not been given. Parliament abolished all disabilities for office or public employment by reason of race, creed, color, or origin ; but distinctions are maintained in administration between previously excluded classes and privileged classes, which place the former in a state of official and social degradation. The state of the police is as bad as before the last Charter Act, and it is no protection to the people. Other instances might be mentioned : and hence your petitioners express their disappointment, and have again to bring these subjects, together with others, under the consideration of Parliament."

In writing now in 1857, four years after the existing Charter Act was under discussion, we admit *some* progress ; but how little and how slow ! On every side, with the progress of European enterprise, with the progress of education, with the gradual development of public works, prospects arise of increased demands on the energies of government ; the hidden wealth, the undeveloped resources, the future influence of this country, open to the view, and we feel more than ever the urgent need of that vigorous administration of public affairs, that introduction of liberal principles of government, that elevation of the social condition of the people, which will enable us to meet effectually our opportunities and our duties.

There is, however, one branch of this subject to which at present we desire to direct attention. It is of the *Commerce*, and *Resources* of the country, as connected with her *Prospects*, that we have now particularly to speak. We do not separate this topic as the most important of all in existing circumstances, (highly important as it undoubtedly is,) but because it is a subject fitted to engage the special attention of a large class at home, whose attention, once gained, will be turned afterwards and necessarily to the general claims and necessities of India, and to the responsibility and duty of the British Legislature in relation to them. It is not because we deem the development of the country's physical resources more important than the due Administration of Justice, the Education of the people, or Christian Missions, or more important than the relation of the Government of India to the Native states, that we now bring it prominently forward ; but because we know the energy, the influence, and the intelligence of that commercial and manufacturing class in England, whose attention we wish to gain ; and because we know that their zeal and public spirit will carry them onward to a general consideration of all the wants of India, if once they fairly become interested in her resources. At present it is not to be denied, that the case is not understood, in this respect, or in any other. It is common to hear members of the House of Commons com-

plain of their inability to deal with Indian subjects, from conscious ignorance of her social and political condition. They have been accustomed to such confidence of assertion, and such apparently triumphant explanations of every difficulty, and then, afterwards, have been so surprised by speedy acknowledgments, made unblushingly, of the very defects which were denied before, that they have become doubtful of every thing—doubtful most of all, of those who, longest and most confidently, have defended the administration of public affairs in India as replete with proofs of consummate wisdom and wonderful success. Many men, both members of the imperial legislature and others, with earnest desires to do justice to this country, have felt compelled to suspend their judgments, and have not ventured to adopt any decided course, though impatient of the existing system, and apprehensive that more complete information would only strengthen their objections to it. In addressing this class of minds now,—men desirous to do full justice to India, men whose consciences dictate to them the duty of investigating her condition, we select the present topic, in the knowledge that the tedious details we shall have to quote will be no obstacles to their patient and careful consideration of the whole subject. We present to them, from various scattered sources, in as summary a form as possible, the facts we have collected, not as exhausting the evidence which could be adduced, but as indicating the kind of information which is accessible, and the particular branches of inquiry which will repay further investigation.

In estimating the resources of India, the first consideration is the extent of the population, not only as a test of the productive powers of the country, but also of its actual production and consumption of food. But it is extremely difficult to reach any satisfactory conclusion on this matter, beyond the fact that the population is certainly not less than one hundred and fifty millions. But the probability is that it greatly exceeds this number. When the Punjab was annexed, the population there was believed to be five or six millions; it has since been ascertained to be thirteen millions. In the North West Provinces the first census gave a return of twenty-three millions; the second census, soon after (which was more careful and complete) gave thirty. In Bengal there appears to be no case in which an estimate of the population has not been exceeded by a local census or careful calculation, except in Calcutta, where it is difficult to define the population accurately at any one moment, so fluctuating is it from day to day, and so various have been the boundaries implied in the term "Calcutta" in various statements. On the whole it may be asserted with entire confidence, that the population is likely to prove, on a complete census, if it be ever

possible to make one, nearer two hundred millions than one hundred and fifty. And all these people are fed by the country; there is no imported food, beyond the luxuries, the wines and spirits, preserves, and the like, imported chiefly for Europeans. In Bengal the food is chiefly rice, fish, fruit, peas, and vegetables. In the Upper Provinces and other parts less rice is used, and atta, the flour of wheat, is substituted for it. Much flesh also is used by the Mohammedans and others. The extent of cultivation for this immense multitude may be conceived. To this must be added the vast natural riches for other wants, iron fitted for many purposes; timber, from teak to the invaluable bamboo; the cotton for native cloth; the silk for native silk dresses; the dyes; the tobacco; wool; betel-nut; oil; and the countless other supplies for daily use in an empire retentive of ancient usages, and accustomed to the manufactures and the habits of life of ancient time. The native landholder, and banker, and merchant, and judicial officer, in his articles of luxury, in his ornaments, and in his dress, to a large extent, uses still the products of his country; and in his silver and gold jewellery, in his shawls, in his furniture, in his lamps, his harness, his pleasure boat, his carriage, he commonly draws almost entirely from native resources, except in the Presidency towns. The country supplies the common trades with leather; ropes; brazen and iron cooking utensils; scales and weights; paper; toys, and many other articles of daily use. There is a great and valuable supply of native drugs, and an immense consumption of native sweetmeats and confectionery; there are native spirituous liquors; and native carpets, glass-ware, guns, pistols, and swords; and the domestic cattle and horses are numerous. The wild animals tamed to use, include great numbers of elephants, buffaloes, and camels.

But it is needless to specify in detail, the products of a country with such a soil, such rivers, such varieties of climate, and such a vast population. A glance at the map will show the valley of the Ganges to be one of the most valuable, extensive and highly favored districts in the world. In that great extent of country, for a course of a thousand miles in length, and in many parts for several hundreds of miles in breadth, all nature teems with life,—fish, vegetation, cattle,—‘for the use of man.’ Affluents pour into the streams alike of the Ganges and Jumna, then joining they flow from Allahabad, five hundred miles onward to the sea, receiving at length the mighty volume of the Bhramaputra, and rushing out through a hundred mouths to the sea. But this is only one line of inland navigation. In the Punjab the Indus, the Sutlej, the Chenab, the Ravee, the Beas, course down to the Indian ocean from the depths, the hidden depths, of untrodden mountains. In Oude

the Gogra (tributary to the Ganges) ; in Western Bengal the Roopnarain, the Damoodah, the Mahanuddy ; in Central Bengal the Jellinghee, Bhaghirati, Matabangah, flowing into the Hooghly ; in Northern Bengal the Mahanuddy ; in Behar the Gunduck ; in Central India the Nerbudda ; in Madras the Godavery, the Coleroon, the Cavery, the Kistnah ; in Guzerat the Taptee—these are but some of the streams of India, which irrigate thousands of square miles. At present, we refrain from speculating on other treasures of this land—it is enough here to specify the resources which easily account for so vast a population being fed from year to year ; for such a population living on, with such few and rare and distant experiences of famine.

But another test is the external Commerce. It is by no means a conclusive test, for there may be countries (Spain for instance, or Mexico) with extraordinary natural resources, but with such political disadvantages, as almost destroy their commerce. In India, however, the external commerce will be found to afford some test, notwithstanding various difficulties and obstructions to its full development. In dealing, however, with this subject, some discrimination is required ; for the exports and imports by sea will by no means afford the only information required. We speak of India in the aggregate, as though there could be no external commerce within its limits. Yet, properly speaking, India consists of a variety of different territories ; and a large part of it, with forty-five millions of people, belongs to native states which are merely subsidiary to the British power. From them, little is exported through our territories to the sea, but much is imported into them from our territories, not only of that which has been imported by sea, but also of that which has been produced in the British dominions. There is also the external commerce over the frontier—with Burmah, the Shan States, Bootan, Nepal, Thibet, Cashmere, and Affghanistan. From the nature of the case, this trade is not large ; and the exports from India probably consist chiefly of goods imported by sea. But in the aggregate there must be a considerable traffic of an external character, of which, since the Transit-duties have been abolished, no accurate account can be given. It affords, however, a prospect of expansion ; and the time may not be distant, when it will be exceedingly valuable. We have the prospect, and should steadily keep in view the probability, of an overland trade with China. We have the power, by a wise and peaceful policy, gradually to conciliate the confidence of the bold and enterprising trader of Central Asia, who even now, amidst danger and with few facilities of access to our country, travels probably fifteen hundred miles to obtain his goods at Calcutta or Mirzapore. What the resources of his country may be, we know not ; but we

do know that on our Affghan frontier, under the Soliman range, there are valleys of exquisite beauty, and the richest fertility, peopled by a brave and independent race, who by twenty years of kindness and justice may be won to our sway, and may then become the pioneers to other lands beyond,—lands of hidden wealth and resources, which, perhaps, are kept, as the mines of California, concealed from mankind, till the exigency of man's commerce plead for their discovery. It is interesting to think of this great expanse of country all beyond India, with Russia entering from the Caspian, penetrating beyond the sea of Aral, occupying Kokan, and, far to the east, navigating the Amur; and to look forward to our vindicating the rights of the unhappy people of Cashmere, whom we sold to Golab Singh, and reclaiming that country in the name of humanity, and then advancing on, not with arms, but with the power of civilization, and the gospel of peace, onwards, it may be, to Tartary. Already a road is being made up the valley of the Sutlej, north-east of Simlah to Chenee in Thibet, a lovely and salubrious spot, whence the restless foot of enterprise will soon be tempted on to other countries. We know not what means may be employed, in the wise and wonderful providence of God, for linking these further regions to our faith, but we cannot believe that all Central Asia will be a spoil and a prey for ever to Mahommedanism, and closed for ever against all improvement. It may be the discovery of silver, it may be the extension of tea cultivation, it may be the trade in borax, we know not what—but the way will be made plain at last, and mountains and warfare will separate no longer our British nation in India, from that noble race who now hate and defy us. We have heard recently of the discoveries in Africa, and we see there the opening up of the course of the Zambesi and its net work of streams in the central region; and so in central Asia, we may owe to some pioneer of truth, the first introduction to lands which we dare not now enter, and to races which are now fierce as the chafed lion of the wilderness. Come it will in some way—this opening up of long closed lands, this welding together of hostile nations: come it will, though its arrival may be delayed, though the first movements toward it may be rejected; through the memory of our ambitious and unjust invasion of Afghanistan, our crooked policy in Central Asia, and the scandal both have brought on the Christian name.

This subject is far too important to be summarily dismissed in a paper on the prospects of India; and it is one which deserves much more careful consideration than it has yet received at home. Our position, at present, is probably the strongest possible. We have the Soliman Range for our North-Western

Frontier, and, within that, we have the Indus. In the valleys of that range, and on either side of it, are a large number of tribes always at war among themselves, and resolute in resisting regular government. Any foe approaching us in this direction would have to enter India through difficult passes, to find us on our own soil, with illimitable resources behind us, and with the entire command of the Indus from the port at Kurrachee to the Hindu Koosh. And with this prospect the foe expected is Russia ! To guard against this danger, it is our policy to check her distant approaches. If Persia occupy Herat, she can command Candahar, and from Candahar has easy access to the commencement of difficulties in the Soliman Range, and Persia is the dependent of Russia, and Russia can gradually advance her posts from Khiva or Astrabad to Herat, and thence onward through Candahar, either with or without Persian intervention. Such is the picture drawn of our danger. But the whole thing is contemptible. In the first place, what is the astute policy by which alone this danger can be averted? Neither Persia alone, nor Persia and Russia combined, shall be permitted to occupy Herat. It is the gate of India. It is to be an independent government for ever. In other words, because our position (wonderfully strong as it is) is not strong enough already, we must have further security by perpetuating between us and Teheran, and between us and the Russians, Herat and all the other vile and murderous despotisms under which for so many centuries Central Asia has been reduced to a battle field of blood-thirsty ferocious Mussalman chiefs. That is the point of morality to which we are carried by the Monro doctrine, which we wish to establish in Asia. Whenever, therefore, any danger arises from Persian attempts on Herat, we must attack that country, reduce its strength and pride, and—render it a still easier prey than before to Russian ambition. It will be found on enquiry, that the ablest men who have studied the subject, acknowledge that the policy involves a constant irritating interference in Central Asia, which rouses the jealousy of all the rulers against us, and which tends to lead us on to conquests beyond our frontier that will produce little or no return, will entail enormous expense, and commit us to still further advances, till at last we shall go to meet the Russians instead of their coming to meet us—we shall meet them in positions where their resources are all near at hand, while ours are all separated from us by mountain ranges, peopled by warlike and treacherous, and perhaps, hostile tribes.

When Herat was in danger before, we adopted this policy. We complained that Russia, while at peace with us, had officers assisting the Persian army : it is matter of history that we had English officers defending the city. And the English govern-

ment carried the House of Commons along with it in extolling our Afghan expedition—the simple expedient being one of the most disgraceful tricks in English history, a careful garbling of a Blue Book, in which passages were so omitted, and passages were brought into such convenient collocation, that exactly the reverse of the truth was exhibited to view. Those who desire proof and illustration of this skilful mode of escaping from a difficulty, for which Lord Palmerston is so famous, may see it in Kaye's History of the War in Afghanistan; and a reference to the subject may be seen, with other important matter, in Dr. Buist's petition to the House of Lords, in their Third Report on Indian Territories, session 1852-53. We refer to the Blue Book, as ordered to be published by the House of Commons. By dexterities of this kind, and exceedingly flourishing accounts of the brilliancy of our successes, our popularity in Afghanistan, the peacefulness of the country, and the entire success of our policy, the delusion was kept up—till our army was massacred; and we had to re-enter the country "to exact retribution," recover our hostages (leaving, it is believed, many British subjects in hopeless slavery,) and then to retreat with "glory;" our monument being erected, in hatred and the desire for revenge, in the hearts of the people. Such was that "famous victory."

But there is another view of this matter. Suppose the case that Russia does advance to Herat,—nay more, that she occupies Teheran, Astrabad, Khiva, Bokhara, Khelat, and Candahar—what then? *We* know by experience that by every movement forward in such a region, we become more and more powerless for aggression. We have new fortresses to hold, new hostilities to dread, new tribes to hold in check. Thus it is now on our present frontier. We have to face on the mountains from Huzara to the Scinde boundary, 135,000 fighting men, and we gallantly hold our own with 23,000 men. But what additional force is necessary behind them? We are in fact compelled to keep a large army in the highest state of efficiency in the Punjab, and if we moved onward to Afghanistan, we should have to increase our forces at every step. Exactly so it must be with Russia. As she advances her frontier amidst the finest races of fighting men in the world, her difficulties will thicken around her; her troops will be more employed in the work of defence at every step; she will have a new Circassia to conquer and to hold; and finally her approach will throw into real alliance with us, the Afghans; who at present are dreading us and not her. But views of this kind are not in keeping with the rash, impulsive, short-sighted policy which has recently become popular, and perhaps, we should apologize for such unwelcome sentiments. We speak,

however, to wise men, let them judge what we say. Let it be remembered that when we occupied the Punjab, we then, for the first time, fairly confronted Central Asia, and that now we have the responsibility connected with our influence in that new position. If we do justice and preserve peace, and gradually conciliate the confidence of the people, if we go on in earnest in India promoting the welfare of the people, and not class-interests, we shall soon find our reputation extending, and to the British Government in India all the tribes will look for guidance and for protection.

In speaking thus of the wisdom and duty of preserving peace, and leaving the internal affairs of Central Asia altogether alone, it is necessary to guard against misconception. This policy is very different from that of maintaining the existing Native states within the Indian frontier. The manner in which the annexation of Oude and Nagpore has been spoken of in England, renders it necessary to insist on the grand and broad distinction between foreign meddling and aggression on the one hand, and the consolidation of our power in India on the other. We are here in a position of extraordinary authority and influence. The whole of this vast population is necessarily affected by our influence, whether they be dwelling in the British dominions, or in the Native states. If in any case we find ourselves, as we did in Oude, the really sovereign power (from the effeteness of the Native Government)—and our power does nothing more than shield the Native rulers in a course of wild, barbarous tyranny,—our course is clear, we must terminate a state of things so dishonoring to our name, and so productive of misery to millions of our fellow men. Just so with the case of states which lapse to us by treaty. Our first duty undoubtedly is to fulfil every word of our obligations; but to contend that in the face of all experience of Native misrule, we are to prefer Native to British government, and to seek for the means of renewing Native dynasties which are but of yesterday, at the best, and have no claim on the gratitude of the country, appears to be strange policy and strange morality. Let these considerations be applied to past and present cases of political relations to Native states, and perhaps, they will help us to a sound conclusion. In truth it was too much the policy formerly to disregard the people altogether, and to end our wars, however treacherous and unprovoked might have been the invasions of our territory we were resisting, by simply bargaining for some money payment and some political rights, and then to replace the conquered satraps on their throne, to grind the people again at their pleasure, to extort from them the tribute we demanded, and to spend the chief part of their states-treasures in the lowest and

most degrading follies and debaucheries. But now we begin to understand, that in every case where a right arises to annex a Native state, it is our duty to consider the people. This we did not after the first Burmese War. We gave back Pegu to Burmah, and the result, which we might have anticipated, followed, in the attempt of the Burmans to exterminate the Peguans who had shown their sympathy with us. And just so it would have been in 1853, with the Karens, had we then again given up that province.

There is, however, a special case which requires to be dealt with on separate grounds. In 1846, when the Sikhs invaded India, and Lord Hardinge was engaged in his arduous contests, Golab Sing, with a considerable force, held aloof. When our army, wearied and reduced, approached Lahore, he advanced with equivocal assurances to meet us. Lord Hardinge, willing to buy off his opposition, and feeling the difficulty of our position while Golab Sing remained as a nucleus for the still numerous though defeated Sikhs to rally round, consented to give him Cashmere in payment for £750,000. The arrangement was not to our honor; it was the result of a weak policy; and was a pitiable sacrifice alike of justice and magnanimity. That unhappy country, thus surrendered to one of the worst of men, has since been so fearfully misgoverned, that the people's groans plead with us on the common ground of humanity for pity and deliverance. And what, we must ask, is our position in the sight of God in relation to that country? The tyrant is dead. We have one great motive for not desiring to interfere—the apprehension that our movements may excite still more the jealousy and the alarm of the surrounding people, and postpone that conciliation of their prejudices which is so desirable. But the case is a special one—not to be decided on considerations of expediency, not to be complicated by the temptations to our trade from the invaluable resources of Cashmere; but to be decided solely on the broad and simple grounds of justice and national responsibility.

In entering on the details of the external trade by sea, a few preliminary remarks may suffice. The returns from each Presidency give the results of the trade with foreign ports, and Indian ports out of that presidency. Thus, while the port-to-port trade in the Madras or Bombay Presidency is excluded, the Trade from one port to another in a different Presidency—Madras, for instance, to Rangoon or to Calcutta, is included. In quoting the returns we propose to deduct the bullion imported or exported by Government from port to port in the Bengal and Bombay Presidencies, but the returns from Madras do not enable us accurately to separate Company's from private treasure.

We propose in each Presidency to allow the Government imports of stores and merchandize to remain. The case of the Straits Settlements must be dealt with separately; and in each case the official value will be given in the first instance.

We commence with the returns of 1853-54, because the two subsequent years may be regarded as exceptional on account of the war. But whether the impulse then given to the trade in particular articles will not be permanent, and whether the rise of prices which then accrued will not, from other causes, be permanent also, must be subjects for separate consideration. The returns from 1853, including the year just closed, will, we believe, fairly indicate our present position, and may be taken as indicative of the tendency of our trade, as to particular articles of export, and the import of treasure, and the increased consumption of British manufactures.

We shall take no cognizance of re-exports, as that would lead us into multifarious details, and into distinctions between re-exports of different classes; and it is not important to dwell on this subject, as the aggregate is not very important in so very large a traffic.

The results then are as follow :—

BENGAL, INCLUDING ARRACAN AND TENASSERIM.

Imports, 1853-54.

Merchandize	£ 5,935,187
Company's ditto £	132,379
Treasure	£ 2,152,322
	<hr/>
£	8,219,888
	<hr/>

Exports, 1853-54.

Merchandize	£ 11,061,155
Treasure	£ 485,069
	<hr/>
	£ 11,546,224
	<hr/>

Total Trade.

Imports	£ 8,219,888
Exports	£ 11,546,224
	<hr/>
	£ 19,766,112
	<hr/>

Bills on Bengal by the Court of Directors

£ 3,336,706

Imports, 1854-55.

Merchandize	£ 6,921,278
Company's ditto £	142,094
Treasure	£ 694,886
	<hr/>
£	7,758,258
	<hr/>

Exports, 1854-55.

Merchandize	£ 11,516,333
Treasure	£ 551,011
	<hr/>
	£ 12,067,344
	<hr/>

Total Trade.

Imports	£ 7,758,258
Exports	£ 12,067,344

£ 19,825,602

Bills on Bengal by the Court of Directors	£ 3,093,959
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*Imports, 1855-56.**Exports, 1855-56.*

Merchandize.....£	8,186,162	Merchandize.....£	13,633,030
Company's ditto £	170,555	Treasure	£ 255,361
Treasure	£ 6,011,225		

13,888,391

£ 14,367,942

Total Trade.

Imports	£ 14,367,942
Exports	£ 13,888,391

£ 28,256,333

Bills on Bengal by the Court of Directors	£ 1,232,633
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SHIPPING.

*Arrivals, 1853-54.**Departures, 1853-54.*

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>		<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
Square Rigged...	990	528,499	Square Rigged	1,027	631,539
Native Craft ...	392	52,139	Native Craft...	495	52,481
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
	1,382	580,638		1,522	684,020
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>

*Arrivals, 1854-55.**Departures, 1854-55.*

Square Rigged	1,225	481,881	Square Rigged	1,151	601,187
Native Craft...	417	44,500	Native Craft...	515	52,868
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
	1,642	526,381		1,666	654,055
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>

*Arrivals, 1855-56.**Departures, 1855-56.*

Square Rigged	1,529	864,227	Square Rigged	1,555	861,546
Native Craft...	514	56,005	Native Craft...	593	61,958
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
	2,043	920,232		2,148	923,504
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>

MADRAS TERRITORIES.

Imports, 1853-54.

Merchandize.....£	1,635,233
Treasure	£ 1,106,029
	<hr/>
	£ 2,741,262
	<hr/>

Exports, 1853-54.

Merchandize.....£	2,997,735
Treasure	£ 1,069,182
	<hr/>
	£ 4,066,917
	<hr/>

Total Trade.

Imports	£ 2,741,262
Exports	£ 4,066,917
	<hr/>
	£ 6,808,179

We have no account to insert here of the bills drawn on Madras by the Court of Directors, but the amount could not be large.

Imports, 1854-55.

Merchandize.....£	1,912,496
Treasure	£ 648,195
	<hr/>
	£ 2,560,691
	<hr/>

Exports, 1854-55.

Merchandize.....£	2,394,808
Treasure	£ 820,695
	<hr/>
	£ 3,215,503
	<hr/>

Total Trade.

Imports	£ 2,560,691
Exports	£ 3,215,503
	<hr/>
	£ 5,776,194
	<hr/>

Imports, 1855-56.

Merchandize.....£	2,313,387
Treasure	£ 1,371,669
	<hr/>
	£ 3,685,056
	<hr/>

Exports, 1855-56.

Merchandize.....£	2,917,090
Treasure	£ 441,875
	<hr/>
	£ 3,358,965
	<hr/>

Total Trade.

Imports	£ 3,685,056
Exports	£ 3,358,965
	<hr/>
	£ 7,044,021
	<hr/>

SHIPPING.

Arrivals, 1853-54.

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
Square Rigged	1,612	361,390*
Native Craft	3,881	182,503
	<hr/> 5,493	<hr/> 543,893

Departures, 1853-54.

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
Square Rigged	2,068	433,975
Native Craft	4,725	210,569
	<hr/> 6,793	<hr/> 644,544

Arrivals, 1854-55.

Square Rigged	1,749	339,212
Native Craft	3,677	171,421
	<hr/> 5,426	<hr/> 510,633

Departures, 1854-55.

Square Rigged	1,982	385,022
Native Craft	4,225	200,951
	<hr/> 6,207	<hr/> 585,973

Arrivals, 1855-56.

Square Rigged	1,221	356,641
Native Craft	4,439	213,918
	<hr/> 5,660	<hr/> 570,559

Departures, 1855-56.

Square Rigged	1,633	463,736
Native Craft	4,875	231,829
	<hr/> 6,508	<hr/> 695,565

PORT OF BOMBAY.

Imports, 1853-54.

Merchandise	...£	6,174,824
Treasure£	2,263,538
		<hr/> £ 8,438,362

Exports, 1853-54.

Merchandise£	7,982,493
Treasure£	1,524,695
		<hr/> £ 9,507,188

Total Trade.

Imports£	8,438,362
Exports£	9,507,188
		<hr/> £ 17,945,550

We have not the return of the bills drawn on Bombay by the Court of Directors, but it may be generally stated that about

* This number of square rigged vessels includes many which called at Madras with a portion of cargo, or with passengers.

£3,500,000 is thus drawn from India for home dividends, pay, pensions, &c.

Imports, 1854-55.

Merchandise ...£	6,497,728
Horses	£ 30,015
Treasure	£ 1,337,478
	<hr/>
£	7,865,221

Exports, 1854-55.

Merchandise ...£	7,464,581
Horses	£ 1,200
Treasure	£ 704,099
	<hr/>
£	8,169,880

Total Trade.

Imports.....	£ 7,865,221
Exports.....	£ 8,169,880
	<hr/>
	£ 16,035,101

Imports, 1855-56.

Merchandise ...£	6,529,663
Horses	£ 74,260
Treasure	£ 4,973,380
	<hr/>
£	11,577,303

Exports, 1855-56.

Merchandise ...£	8,940,639
Horses.....	£ 2,260
Treasure	£ 1,345,016
	<hr/>
£	10,287,915

Total Trade.

Imports	£ 11,577,303
Exports	£ 10,287,915
	<hr/>
	£ 21,865,218

SHIPPING.

Arrivals, 1853-54.

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
Square Rigged	313	191,014
Native Craft	5,567	209,973
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	5,880	400,987

Departures, 1853-54.

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
Square Rigged	300	179,823
Native Craft	4,631	173,474
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	4,931	353,297

Arrivals, 1854-55.

Square Rigged	285	181,159
Native Craft...	4,899	185,700
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	5,184	366,859

Departures, 1854-55.

Square Rigged	294	182,090
Native Craft...	3,735	147,067
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	4,029	329,157

Arrivals, 1855-56.

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
Square Rigged	320	229,403
Native Craft...	5,845	223,524
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	6,165	452,927
	<hr/>	<hr/>

Departures, 1855-56.

	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
Square Rigged	324	231,496
Native Craft...	4,372	167,824
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	4,696	399,320
	<hr/>	<hr/>

This return, however, thus far applies only to the port of Bombay. The returns for the other ports of the Bombay Presidency, as follows:—Alibaug, Bassein, Broach, Bulsar, Caringah, Dholarah, Gogo, Ghurbunds, Jumbosur, Kurrachee, Mahonu, Oolpar, Omergun, Panwell, Rajpooree, Rutnaghur, Soovendroog, Surat, Tarra-pore, Tromboy, Unjunwell, Vingorla, Vizradroog, Waghra, Warree—exhibiting in detail the imports and exports, appear in the report of external commerce of Bombay for 1855-56. The amounts given by these returns are:

Imports.

Merchandise	£ 286,930
	<hr/>

Exports.

Merchandise	£ 285,643
	<hr/>

But we have not the means of presenting a comparison with former reports, and therefore will omit them in the aggregates which we shall have to present.

The Report of the Administration of the Province of Pegu affords some considerable information of its external trade, both by sea and the rivers. The returns (deducting £200,000 annually, as the fair estimate of imported Government treasure) may be stated as follows, for the aggregate of the four ports of Rangoon, Dalhousie, Toongoo, and Thyat-Mew.

MERCHANDISE AND TREASURE, 1853-54.

Imports	£ 344,737
Exports	£ 381,601
	<hr/>
	£ 726,338
	<hr/>

1854-55.

Imports	£ 755,827
Exports	£ 852,513
	<hr/>
	£ 1,608,340
	<hr/>

1855-56.

Imports	£ 1,267,071
Exports	£ 663,785
	<hr/>
	£ 1,930,856

We have not the tables of the Straits' Settlements beyond 1853-54, but as the trade there is certainly on the increase, the following returns for 1852-53 and 1853-54 may be an understatement, rather than an exaggeration, of the trade in the years to which the preceding returns refer.

IMPORTS, 1852-53.

Prince of Wales' Island.

Merchandise	£ 539,018
Treasure and Bullion	£ 38,087
	<hr/>
	£ 577,105

Singapore.

Merchandise	£ 2,804,584
Treasure and Bullion	£ 421,438
	<hr/>
	£ 3,226,022

Malacca.

Merchandise	£ 63,832
Treasure and Bullion	£ 15,094
	<hr/>
	£ 78,926

EXPORTS, 1852-53.

Prince of Wales' Island.

Merchandise	£ 622,128
Treasure and Bullion	£ 160,454
	<hr/>
	£ 782,582

Singapore.

Merchandise	£ 2,312,231
Treasure and Bullion	£ 475,842
	<hr/>
	£ 2,788,073

Malacca.

Merchandise	£ 37,267
Treasure and Bullion	£ 26,575
	<hr/>
Total Exports	£ 63,842

Total for Straits' Settlements.

Imports.....	£ 3,882,053
Exports	£ 3,634,497

IMPORTS, 1853-54.

Prince of Wales' Island.

Merchandise	£ 581,239
Treasure and Bullion	£ 93,061
	<hr/>
	£ 674,300

EXPORTS, 1853-54.

Prince of Wales' Island.

Merchandise	£ 689,002
Treasure and Bullion	£ 179,945
	<hr/>
	£ 868,947

Singapore.

Merchandize.....	£ 3,191,546
Treasure and } Bullion ... }	£ 956,144
	<hr/> £ 4,147,690 <hr/>

Singapore.

Merchandize	£ 2,389,788
Treasure and } Bullion ... }	£ 1,018,017
	<hr/> £ 3,407,805 <hr/>

Malacca.

Merchandize.....	£ 84,162
Treasure and } Bullion ... }	£ 956,144
	<hr/> £ 1,040,306 <hr/>

Malacca.

Merchandize....	£ 845,133
Treasure and } Bullion ... }	£ 25,330
	<hr/> 870,463 <hr/>

Total for the Straits' Settlements.

Imports	£ 5,862,296	Exports.....	£ 5,147,215
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This is exclusive of the intermediate trade.

The Report of the Administration of the Straits' Settlements, during 1855-56, does not give any detailed statement of the trade, but it contains the following remarks:—

“ While the trade of Penang and Malacca has but little increased, since 1850-51, that of Singapore has experienced a very remarkable rise, and is now nearly seventy-five per cent. greater in amount than in 1850-51, shewing an extent during the past year of ninety-five millions of rupees (£9,500,000.)”

A caution is then added against entire reliance on the returns of trade, as the port being a free port, no check exists on the values and estimates of the traders; and it is then said:—

“ The position of Singapore, in a commercial point of view, is so admirable, that little surprise is felt at the great and annually increasing amount of trade that has there developed itself. Its harbour is open, accessible from all quarters, and free from all dangers of winds and waves. Every ship between India and China must, it may be said, go through the harbour, while it becomes a *dépôt* for the produce of the whole of the Malayan Peninsula and Archipelago, of Borneo, of Siam, Cambodia and Cochin China, which it attracts with double force, by its freedom from all the annoyances and vexatious interference of a custom-house and its myrmidons. Such freedom is peculiarly grateful to the sensitive and jealous Malay, not on account of the absence of all money payments, but that he has no apprehension of being meddled with, cheated, and perhaps ill-treated; and so long as that freedom continues, so long may we look forward to a perennial augmentation of a trade that is already almost unexampled in its growth and magnitude.”

A paper is then annexed, which, without distinguishing mer-

chandize and treasure, gives us the following aggregate of exports and imports for Singapore alone.

<i>Exports.</i>		<i>Imports.</i>	
1854-55.....£	3,339,937	1854-55.....£	3,974,624
1855-56.....£	4,427,229	1855-56.....£	5,144,167
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Increase...£	1,087,292	Increase...£	1,169,543
<hr/>		<hr/>	

Having regard to the very uncertain and imperfect nature of these returns, we propose to take as a tolerably fair index to the actual extent of the exports and imports of the Straits' Settlements, the following estimate :—

<i>Imports, 1853-54.</i>		<i>Exports, 1853-54.</i>	
Merchandize	£ 2,500,000	Merchandize	£ 2,400,000
Treasure and }	£ 500,000	Treasure and }	£ 600,000
Bullion ... }		Bullion ... }	
<hr/>		<hr/>	
£ 3,000,000		£ 3,000,000	
<hr/>		<hr/>	

<i>Imports, 1854-55.</i>		<i>Exports, 1854-55.</i>	
Merchandize	£ 2,800,000	Merchandize	£ 3,000,000
Treasure and }	£ 1,500,000	Treasure and }	£ 1,000,000
Bullion ... }		Bullion ... }	
<hr/>		<hr/>	
£ 4,300,000		£ 4,000,000	
<hr/>		<hr/>	

Imports and Exports, 1855-56.

Imports, Merchandize, Treasure, and Bullion	£ 5,000,000
Exports, Merchandize, Treasure, and Bullion	£ 4,000,000
<hr/>	
£ 9,000,000	
<hr/>	

This may still be an excessive estimate, but if we exceed at all here, it must be remembered on the other hand that we have not included the trade of the minor ports of the Bombay Presidency.

Before passing into the aggregates presented by all the foregoing details, it may be interesting to notice the nature of this trade. It is stated in the report for 1853-54, that the total number of square rigged vessels which had imported into the Straits in the preceding year, was 1,124 of 382,032 tons, and the number that had exported was 1,152 of 380,688 tons, exclusive of 1,605 vessels of 189,115 tons, trading between the three stations. Of native craft, 4,559 vessels, aggregating 115,619 tons

had imported, and 5,384 aggregating 112,187 tons had exported, exclusive of 1,273 vessels aggregating 46,768 tons, trading between the three stations.

The following statement is given by the Commissioner as an illustration of the value of these settlements to the Mother country, and of their relations to the Dutch Colonies, demonstrating "the judicious selection of Singapore, as an emporium, and its advantages as a free port"—

Trade of Penang with Great Britain.

Imports in 1853-54	£ 103,572	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 83,610	
		Increase, £ 19,962
Exports in 1853-54	£ 174,533	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 132,027	
		Increase, £ 42,506
Total Increase in 1853-54,		<u>£ 62,468</u>

Trade of Singapore with Great Britain.

Imports in 1853-54	£ 1,184,333	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 790,610	
		Increase, £ 393,723
Exports in 1853-54	£ 564,142	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 407,696	
		Increase, £ 156,446
Total Increase in 1853-54,		<u>£ 550,169</u>

Trade of Singapore with the Australian Colonies.

Imports in 1853-54	£ 118,249	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 27,922	
		Increase, £ 90,327
Exports in 1853-54	£ 167,633	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 115,809	
		Increase, £ 51,824
Total Increase in 1853-54,		<u>£ 142,151</u>

*Trade of Singapore with Java, Macassar, Rhio, Bally, Somback,
and Sambawa.*

Imports in 1853-54	£ 491,552	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 274,393	
		<hr/>
	Increase,	£ 217,159
Exports in 1853-54	£ 347,535	
Ditto in 1852-53	£ 211,856	
		<hr/>
	Increase,	£ 135,679
		<hr/>
Total Increase in 1853-54,	£ 352,838	

The articles principally imported in the last mentioned year were cotton goods chiefly from the United Kingdom, valued at about £ 850,000, grain, China petty goods, cheroots, silk and silk goods, opium, sugar, tea, tobacco, spices ; and the exports were cheroots, birds' nests, cotton goods, rice, gums, metals, opium, silk goods, spices, sugar, timber.

Of the vessels that arrived at Singapore in 1853-54, the following is the list:—

Austrian	1	Native (Flag)	20
American	47	Portuguese	14
Arabian	9	Peruvian	2
Belgian	3	Prussian	3
Bremen	8	Russian	2
Danish	9	Siamese	25
Dutch	179	Swedish	15
French	18	Spanish	6
Hambro.....	21	British	644
Norwegian	2		

The Cosmopolitan character of Malacca and of Penang (the port of Prince of Wales' Island) is very similar.

In referring to all these foregoing statements, we find the following results:—

Total Trade, 1853-54.

Bengal.....	£ 19,766,112
Madras	£ 6,808,179
Bombay	£ 17,945,550
Pegu	£ 726,338
Straits' Settlements	£ 6,000,000
	<hr/>
	£ 51,246,179

Total Trade, 1854-55.

Bengal	£ 19,825,602
Madras	£ 5,776,194
Bombay	£ 16,035,101
Pegu	£ 1,608,340
Straits' Settlements	£ 8,300,000
	<hr/>
	£ 51,545,237

1855-56.

Bengal	£ 28,256,333
Madras	£ 7,044,021
Bombay	£ 21,865,218
Pegu	£ 1,930,856
Straits' Settlements	£ 9,000,000
	<hr/>
	£ 68,096,428

Or, in another form, as follows:—

<i>Imports, 1853-54.</i>		<i>Exports, 1853-54.</i>	
Bengal	£ 8,219,888	£ 11,546,224	
Madras	£ 2,741,262	£ 4,066,917	
Bombay	£ 8,438,362	£ 9,507,188	
Pegu	£ 344,737	£ 381,601	
Straits' Settlements	£ 3,000,000	£ 3,000,000	
	<hr/>		
	£ 22,744,249	£ 28,501,930	

<i>Imports, 1854-55.</i>		<i>Exports, 1854-55.</i>	
Bengal	£ 7,758,258	£ 12,067,344	
Madras	£ 2,560,691	£ 3,215,503	
Bombay	£ 7,865,221	£ 8,169,880	
Pegu	£ 755,827	£ 852,513	
Straits' Settlements	£ 4,300,000	£ 4,000,000	
	<hr/>		
	£ 23,239,997	£ 28,305,240	

<i>Imports, 1855-56.</i>		<i>Exports, 1855-56.</i>	
Bengal	£ 14,367,942	£ 13,888,391	
Madras	£ 3,685,056	£ 3,358,965	
Bombay	£ 11,577,303	£ 10,287,915	
Pegu	£ 1,267,071	£ 663,785	
Straits' Settlements	£ 5,000,000	£ 4,000,000	
	<hr/>		
	£ 35,897,372	£ 32,199,056	

We do not propose to proceed to any detailed consideration of the trade of 1856-57, ending the 30th April last, as complete returns are not at present available; but the following estimate, though not absolutely accurate, will be found very nearly so. It includes only Calcutta, the Madras territories, and the Bombay territories.

CALCUTTA, 1856-57.

<i>Imports.</i>		<i>Exports.</i>	
Merchandize	£7,841,730	Merchandize.....	£13,618,626
Treasure	£6,638,685	Treasure	£ 1,003,676
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	£14,480,415		£14,622,302
	<hr/>		<hr/>

MADRAS TERRITORIES, 1856-57.

<i>Imports.</i>		<i>Exports.</i>	
Merchandize	£2,305,898	Merchandize.....	£ 3,717,380
Treasure	£1,613,515	Treasure	£ 344,186
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	£3,919,413		£4,061,566
	<hr/>		<hr/>

BOMBAY, 1856-57.

<i>Imports.</i>		<i>Exports.</i>	
Merchandize	£7,629,221	Merchandize	£10,983,008
Treasure	£8,248,361	Treasure.....	£ 1,588,873
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	£15,877,582		£12,571,881
	<hr/>		<hr/>

The foregoing results, it must be observed, are afforded, (as to all but the Straits' Settlements) by the official values. It then becomes an important and interesting question, how far these official estimates are true criteria of the real value. That the official value, on the whole, affords a correct index in the case of the imports, appears to be admitted: being, it may be, erroneous, in respect of some articles, by too high a valuation, and erroneous by too low a valuation in respect of others; but on the whole affording a fair estimate of the aggregate value of the imports—at least in Bengal. But this is not so, at present, in respect of the exports, as we shall proceed to show. Enough, however, has already been stated to warrant Adam Smith's

suggestion, that "the East Indies offered a market for the manufactures of Europe greater and more extensive than Europe and Asia put together."

These results too recall Lord Grenville's most masterly and noble speech in 1813: the greatest speech ever delivered on Indian affairs. At that time the aggregate of the trade of India with Great Britain, was not £2,500,000 a year, (Exports and Imports), and the evidence given for the East India Company, by its witnesses, went to show the improbability of any extended demand for European goods. Such was the doctrine gravely propounded by eminent witnesses in defence of the monopoly—Warren Hastings, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, and others. But said Lord Grenville in the House of Lords :—

"To what extent this trade of India may be carried, presumptuous indeed would be the man who would now venture to pronounce. On what evidence, what conjecture would he found his judgment? What present knowledge, what past experience of India could possibly decide that question? 'No commerce,' Trebatius or Quintus Cicero returning from a campaign in Britain, would probably have informed the Roman Senate; 'no commerce can ever be carried on with that uncivilized, uncultivated island, divided absolutely from the whole world by tempestuous, unnavigable seas, and inhabited only by naked and houseless barbarians.' 'No commerce,' some sage counsellor of Henry and Elizabeth, might, with equal authority, have assured those monarchs, 'can ever be opened with the dreary wild of North America, a land covered with impenetrable forests, the shelter only of some wandering tribes of the rudest and most ferocious savages.' Yet of these predictions, the folly might be palliated by inexperience. In the defect of better knowledge, such conjectures might even pass for wisdom. But what shall we say to those, who deny the possibility, not of opening new sources for the commerce of mankind, but of enlarging its present channels—who tell us that the trade we now carry on with India, must, in all future times, be limited to its actual amount? Strange and unprecedented necessity, which has thus set bounds to human industry and enterprise, arresting the progress of commercial intercourse, and by some blasting and malignant influence, blighted the natural increase of social improvement! With full and confident assurance, may we repel these idle apprehensions. By commerce commerce will increase, and industry by industry. So it has ever happened, and the Great Creator of the world has not exempted India from this common law of our nature. The supply, first following the demand, will soon extend it. By new facilities, new wants and new desires will be produced. And neither climate nor religion, nor long established habits—no, nor even poverty itself, the greatest of all present obstacles, will ultimately refuse the bene-

fits of such an intercourse to the native population of that empire. They will derive from the extension of commerce, as every other people has uniformly derived from it, new comforts and new conveniences of life, new incitements to industry, and new employments, in just reward of increased activity and enterprise."

So spake the statesman ; and history records the begun fulfilment of his prediction, and encourages the confident belief, that larger anticipations than even that illustrious man himself probably ever entertained, will be realized before a century has past from his delivery of that magnificent oration. The point to which we have already reached, will be now ascertained by an enquiry into the value of the exports of the year we have last reviewed, 1855-56. The question of gradual progress will then next engage our attention.

It is at all times difficult to fix the value of goods for duty, but of course particularly so in a fluctuating market, and when the articles to be valued vary much in quality. Probably the best plan in large ports is to issue, yearly or half-yearly, tariffs of values, based on fair averages. If this be not done, there must always be much uncertainty, and great loss to the revenue from under-valuation, or complaints of restrictions on commerce from excessive duties. In the one article of sugar, for instance, the prices of the various sorts of one kind ranged in 1855-56, from nine rupees eight annas (nineteen shillings) a maund to five rupees four annas, and the combined average price for all sorts of that one kind of sugar was seven rupees or fourteen shillings ; for the various sorts of another kind, the range was from seven rupees to four rupees ; the general average being five rupees ten annas ; and for the third kind the range for various sorts was, from six rupees fourteen annas to three rupees twelve annas, the combined average for this kind being five rupees two annas. This was the range of markets for Benares, Date, and Dummah Sugar. But this affords very little guide in now estimating the real value of this article, which is exported free of duty. Much less will any returns of this description afford an accurate guide for articles on which there is a duty levied on the real value ; it being evidently anything but the interest of the exporter to assist the Custom House, in assessing the utmost value. Moreover, while the returns afford evidence of the gross quantities shipped, and it is easy to ascertain the range of prices for any particular descriptions of an article ; it is almost impossible, when the fluctuation of prices has been considerable and frequent, when there is no mode of testing the relative amounts and proportions of the different sorts of such an article shipped, to deter-

mine absolutely what the real value of any past year's shipments has been. It is clear, however, that if there has been a decided general rise in prices, and that the chief activity in shipping prevailed at the time when prices were highest, then any return of values based on precisely the same data as to prices, as were used under the lower standard of the previous year, must be erroneous. And such was precisely the case with the Bengal Exports of 1855-56. We have seen one calculation, by a very competent person, which makes the real value of the Exports of 1856 to be £19,922,803; but this high estimate includes packing and shipping charges, duties, commission, &c. &c.: this plan having been adopted, in that table, with reference to other calculations respecting the Exchanges. Our own impression, from careful consideration and attentive examination of the subject, certainly is, that the real Calcutta market value of the Exports of 1855-56, (the official year), which were valued at £13,888,391, was nearly £16,500,000. But as the value of the Imports is based on the Invoices, which include the charges, insurance, and freight, the comparison between this £16,500,000, as our market value, with the value of Imports, will be delusive. We need not indeed add the freight of Exports, as it is not usually paid in India, but other charges, to the amount of more than ten per cent., must be added, making the aggregate value of Exports, to be repaid in India, by Merchandise, or Bullion, or remittances of the Company's Bills for our tribute, probably £18,000,000. But it is to be remembered that not all the Imports can be set off against the Exports, for some certainly come to this country for permanent investment. Such is the case with importations of Railway materials.

A very brief examination of details will illustrate our position as to the market value, as contrasted with the official. Taking Linseed for example, the official value at two rupees for 2,538,225 Indian maunds, (about 900,00 tons), was £507,824; but it may be questioned, if four rupees a maund was too high an average for the whole of the Linseed shipped in that year. This would give £1,015,648. The difference in Saltpetre was not so remarkable, but still the real value exceeded considerably the official. In the case of Jute, the official value for 1,194,470 maunds, was £327,476, at ten rupees a bale of three hundred pounds; but a very careful calculation gives an average of at least twelve rupees eight annas, or twenty-five per cent. additional. In the case of rice, the official value of 9,187,259 maunds, (328,000 tons), was £1,047,133; but we believe that at least one rupee a maund may fairly be added to this estimate, giving a result of upwards of

£ 900,000 additional. On this article there is a fixed duty of one anna and a half a maund, and there is consequently no reason for concealment of the value; and now steps are being taken, by monthly returns from the Chamber of Commerce, to ascertain the value accurately. In the case of Raw Silk, the duty is three annas and a half per seer, (or two pounds), and in this case also the real value probably could henceforth be easily ascertained. The official value given for 18,229 maunds, in 1855-56, was £703,822, that is for 729,160 seers—an average of somewhat less than ten rupees (£1) a seer. It is difficult now to form an opinion on the subject with any confidence, from the varieties of Silk that were in the market, but on the whole it may probably be stated with tolerable confidence that twelve rupees eight annas would be a fair average, giving in this case also, an increase of twenty-five per cent. The proportionate increase in Mustard Seed, of which 1,307,115 maunds were shipped, and were valued (at two rupees a maund) at £261,541, may be taken to be equal to that in Linseed; or a hundred per cent. In the case of Opium, 44,937 chests are valued officially at £3,638,917, and this is doubtless correct, and the official value of Sugar may also be correct, if it does not indeed exceed the real value. But taking a long series of articles: Indigo, Cotton, Wheat, and other Grain, Castor Oil, Gunnies, and Gunny Cloth, Hides, Lac, Poppy Seed, Provisions, Rum, Safflower, Tea, &c.; it may be fair to say that twenty or twenty-five per cent. on the average, might be fairly added to the official value. The rise of prices in the course of the official year was undoubtedly very great, and continued almost up to its termination. The news of the peace was entirely unexpected, and did not reach Calcutta in a definite and authentic form till March.

The rise in the prices in the other Presidencies, probably was not so great, and the consequent temporary disparity between the real and the tariff value, not so great as in Bengal. But if it be stated generally, that the real market value of Exports from the three Presidencies, Pegu and the Straits, was thirty-six or thirty-seven millions sterling, instead of £32,199,056, as previously calculated from the official returns, or nearly *forty millions*, with the duties and charges, few perhaps will question the accuracy of the supposition.

The general subject of prices in India is one of much interest and importance, but at present, it is too early to reach any definite conclusion. In the interior it is notorious that prices of produce, of labour, and of boat hire, have risen greatly. Shippers, the Railway Company, and the Government alike feel it,

But as new modes of communication are created, a vast increase will occur in the quantities of produce brought to market, and probably also in the amount of labour available; and a reaction may begin. In some articles the rise in the market value, during the last five years, has been remarkable—in some articles more than a hundred per cent.; and these articles of increasing export,—such as Seeds, Rice, and Jute. The immediate result is so great a rise in the retail price of the chief articles of a Bengali's consumption, that discontent and some suffering are the consequences. But the tendency is to a compensating rise in wages, and to increased production, with the consequent increase of wealth. But the restricted means of internal communication render the process of diffusion of new elements, more difficult here than in more favored lands, and give a kind of monopoly to the productions of a part only of the country, and thus artificially raise the prices of provisions. It is not supposed that the country does not already yield much more than is required for its own consumption, and its present enlarged export; but so very large a part of this production is confined to places which are at present inaccessible, that there is a large surplus quantity from year to year, harvest after harvest, which cannot reach the great markets to equalize the general prices throughout all the districts.

It is however exceedingly interesting and gratifying to notice the progress made in the external commerce, as an indication that the expanse of country, and portion of the population concerned in the country trade, must have increased and must still be rapidly increasing. The facts on this subject are of a very remarkable character, and deserve careful consideration, not merely as proofs of the great change already effected by freedom of commerce, since 1813, but also as affording substantial ground for the expectation of greatly enlarged advances.

The earliest return of the tonnage entered inwards at Calcutta, is for the year 1795-96. Up to year 1829-30, the period to which the return extends, the following was the number of vessels from the United Kingdom and all parts beyond India:—

YEARS.	GRAND TOTAL.	
	Ships.	Tons.
1795—96.....	170	57,696
1796—97.....	172	63,924
1797—98.....	139	52,464
1798—99.....	121	43,349
1799—1800.....	145	47,403
1800—1	170	54,759
1801—2	153	52,914
1802—3	205	81,293
1803—4	177	65,027
1804—5	185	69,557
1805—6	210	82,814
1806—7	245	92,652
1807—8	194	72,544
1808—9	151	50,545
1809—10.....	168	63,151
1810—11.....	200	69,179
1811—12.....	225	87,124
1812—13.....	226	84,228
1813—14.....	222	77,192
1814—15.....	200	68,928
1815—16.....	291	94,966
1816—17.....	369	142,006
1817—18.....	428	161,346
1818—19	395	157,441
1819—20.....	273	103,553
1820—21.....	261	104,932
1821—22.....	261	102,864
1822—23.....	286	116,641
1823—24.....	228	87,524
1824—25.....	274	111,641
1825—26.....	244	97,281
1826—27.....	245	97,067
1827—28.....	304	111,233
1828—29.....	278	110,214
1829—30.....	236	89,655

We quote from the return in the Appendix to the Report of the House of Commons, in 1832—as published by the Court of Directors, in 1833. The notes to it indicate the constant persuasion of the Reporter of external commerce, that the opening of the trade with India in 1813 was a very doubtful measure. It is true that the Imports from Great Britain rose from about fifty-three lakhs of sicca rupees, (or about

£650,000), in 1813-1814 to 1,59,44,495 sicca rupees, or nearly two millions sterling, in 1818-19; but then that "burst of enterprise and speculation" recoiled on its promoters. In 1821-22, it is remarked that "the demand for the produce and manufactures of Europe, must be confined to a few articles only, and the average of the preceding five years is regarded as too favorable a prospect." But following up the case beyond the date of this return, we find a strange comment on this opinion, thus propounded in Calcutta, and prepared for publication to the world at the East India House! We will confine ourselves to a series of years, which we shall presently have to review for other purposes, premising however, that the last extract given by the Court in 1832 from its Calcutta reports, is as follows: "We submit a retrospect of the last ten years, drawing a comparison between the five years last past, and the five years antecedent to that period, the aggregate result of which is a decrease in the trade both in the Imports and Exports."

SHIPS AND TONNAGE ARRIVED AT CALCUTTA.

	<i>Square Rigged Vessels.*</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
1833-34	339	124,160
1834-35	223	120,635
1835-36	312	111,400
<hr/>		
1843-44	574	237,274
1844-45	668	454,547
1845-46	669	290,260
<hr/>		
1853-54	677	397,930
1854-55	866	481,188
1855-56	1,134	650,320

The following may suffice for illustrations of the tonnage that entered the Ports of the Madras Territories, and the Bombay Presidency, commencing with the earliest return—in 1802, as published by the Court of Directors.

* This is intended to exclude Native Craft, but some such seem to have been included in the preceding statement,—Dhonies from the Maldives.

MADRAS.

	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
1802	88	38,342
1807 (including Native Craft)	2,045	110,009
1812-13	936	76,497
1817-18	1,160	90,789
1822-23	1,185	96,781
1827-28	1,918	109,537
1829-30 (the last in this return)	2,239	110,571

The other papers before us, as to this Presidency, only enable us to add the following supplement :

1844-45	6,181	430,295
1847-48	5,858	448,712
1853-54	5,496	543,893
1854-55	5,426	510,633
1855-56	6,508	695,565

BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.

1802-3 (this is the earliest return) ..	83	33,155
1807-8	82	37,069
1812-13	85	30,847
1817-18	139	59,804
1822-23	120	48,118
1827-28	152	69,241
1829-30 (the latest in this return) ..	132	63,548

This may probably represent square rigged vessels only. With it we may compare the following :

PORT OF BOMBAY ONLY.

	<i>Square Rigged Vessels.</i>	<i>Tonnage.</i>
1843-44	378	169,187
1844-45	337	145,057

And the following result of 1855-56 for the whole Presidency :—

ARRIVALS, 1855-56.

	<i>Square rigged vessels and Native craft. Tonnage.</i>	
Bombay	6,165	452,927
Other Ports in the Bombay Presidency.	5,459	96,270
	<hr/> 11,624	<hr/> 5,49,197

The progress of the trade of each Presidency may be ascer-

tained, however, by other returns. The following is a table showing the external trade of Bengal from 1813-14 to 1855-56 inclusive:—

Statement showing the Trade, Imports and Exports.

Years.	Imports value.	Exports value.	Total value.
1813—14... ..	£ 2,266,668	£ 4,645,106	£ 6,911,774
1814—15... ..	2,712,642	4,749,950	7,462,592
1815—16... ..	3,617,934	5,641,083	9,259,017
1816—17... ..	6,210,844	6,135,335	12,346,179
1817—18... ..	6,305,123	6,541,790	12,846,913
1818—19... ..	8,207,800	6,189,536	14,397,336
1819—20... ..	5,860,664	6,097,881	11,958,545
1820—21... ..	4,651,649	5,803,261	10,454,910
1821—22... ..	4,805,303	6,594,951	11,400,254
1822—23... ..	4,415,591	6,700,344	11,115,935
1823—24... ..	3,936,765	6,279,833	10,216,598
1824—25... ..	4,079,818	5,610,803	9,690,621
1825—26... ..	3,655,673	5,677,862	9,333,535
1826—27... ..	3,436,083	5,234,135	8,670,218
1827—28... ..	4,219,917	6,400,809	10,620,726
1828—29... ..	3,709,510	5,204,515	8,914,025
1829—30... ..	3,468,613	5,668,688	9,137,301
1830—31... ..	3,338,665	5,417,716	8,756,381
1831—32... ..	2,800,815	5,818,172	8,618,987
1832—33... ..	2,509,301	5,669,477	8,178,778
1833—34... ..	2,569,445	5,552,034	8,121,479
1834—35... ..	2,949,431	4,590,902	7,440,333
1835—36... ..	3,155,898	5,989,431	9,145,329
1836—37... ..	4,042,907	7,401,036	11,443,943
1837—38... ..	4,171,564	7,554,488	11,726,052
1838—39... ..	4,400,000	7,337,691	11,737,691
1839—40... ..	5,639,232	7,382,419	13,021,651
1840—41... ..	6,392,825	8,809,871	15,202,696
1841—42... ..	6,168,092	8,762,765	14,930,857
1842—43... ..	6,273,308	7,923,502	14,196,810
1843—44... ..	6,929,386	10,601,683	17,531,069
1844—45... ..	8,487,961	10,527,307	19,015,268
1845—46... ..	6,966,348	10,601,269	17,567,617
1846—47... ..	7,230,511	9,894,849	17,125,360
1847—48... ..	6,186,565	9,343,200	15,529,765
1848—49... ..	6,392,109	10,201,458	16,593,567
1849—50... ..	7,369,012	11,150,566	18,519,578
1850—51... ..	7,935,967	10,818,058	18,754,025
1851—52... ..	10,226,007	11,111,770	21,337,777
1852—53... ..	9,394,283	12,114,686	21,508,969
1853—54... ..	8,219,888	11,546,224	19,766,112
1854—55... ..	7,758,258	12,067,344	19,825,602
1855—56... ..	14,367,942	13,888,391	28,256,333

The Report of External Commerce of Bombay for 1855-56 contains the following table for the same period, but it is confined to the trade with the United Kingdom :—

Abstract Statement of the value of Trade between the Port of Bombay and the United Kingdom, since the opening of the Trade, exclusive of the Company's Investments, from 1813-14 to 1855-56.

No.	Years.	Imports.	Exports and Re-exports.
		£	£
1	1813—14...	92,698	305,154
2	1814—15...	139,865	277,589
3	1815—16...	230,329	259,467
4	1816—17...	298,453	201,846
5	1817—18...	489,519	476,000
6	1818—19...	709,023	773,615
7	1819—20...	560,250	568,060
8	1820—21...	361,621	148,972
9	1821—22...	439,420	253,839
10	1822—23...	562,471	524,650
11	1823—24...	557,131	595,385
12	1824—25...	502,404	588,788
13	1825—26...	430,242	649,246
14	1826—27...	495,587	393,881
15	1827—28...	819,693	568,592
16	1828—29...	781,248	833,767
17	1829—30...	911,606	547,329
18	1830—31...	1,106,636	684,009
19	1831—32...	902,315	636,026
20	1832—33...	1,108,268	1,041,773
21	1833—34...	904,239	1,018,479
22	1834—35...	940,584	969,547
23	1835—36...	1,248,196	1,461,700
24	1836—37...	1,324,191	1,352,931
25	1837—38...	1,127,911	854,427
26	1838—39...	1,117,765	764,969
27	1839—40...	1,387,373	1,190,846
28	1840—41...	1,946,290	1,663,180
29	1841—42...	1,723,923	1,836,709
30	1842—43...	1,947,865	1,350,405
31	1843—44...	2,433,571	1,704,674
32	1844—45...	2,415,978	1,229,692
33	1845—46...	1,743,268	911,308
34	1846—47...	1,520,328	1,382,111
35	1847—48...	1,358,888	1,195,863
36	1848—49...	1,599,361	1,243,111
37	1849—50...	2,721,204	1,871,417
38	1850—51...	2,866,009	2,406,557
39	1851—52...	2,684,598	1,647,677
40	1852—53...	2,931,975	2,938,595
41	1853—54...	3,161,530	2,655,482
42	1854—55...	3,253,453	2,395,412
43	1855—56...	3,195,012	3,413,780

The East India Company was a corporation of considerable influence and importance, when its exports were (in 1689) 4,520 tons in eleven vessels to "India, the South Seas and China." Its progress subsequently is, in some measure, traced in the able review of the External Commerce of Bengal published in 1830, by Mr. J. Bell, then of the Calcutta Custom House. But a new and complete review of the whole Commerce of the whole of India, at the present time, would be entitled to general attention, and is now much required. Sufficient materials, however, are supplied by the Parliamentary Reports to enable us to obtain a general impression of the course and tendency of the country's commercial developement. The Third Report of the Lords' Committee on Indian Territories in 1852-53, has a series of valuable appendices prepared by the Court of Directors. It is there stated that in the preceding years, India might be said to have enjoyed Free Trade by the abolition of Transit or Inland Duties, the removal of the Export Duties on Sugar and Cotton, and the equalization of the Duties on British and Foreign Ships. The total trade of India in the year following the Charter Act of 1833, and the year 1849-50, (which was selected probably, because it was the latest for which complete accounts had been received) was thus stated :—

IMPORTS.

	<i>Merchandise.</i>	<i>Treasure.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
1834-35	£ 4,261,106	£1,893,023	£ 6,154,129
1849-50	£ 10,299,888	£3,396,807	£ 13,696,695

EXPORTS.

1834-35	£ 7,993,420	£ 194,740	£ 8,188,160
1849-50	£ 17,312,299	£ 971,244	£ 18,283,543

A valuable table follows, showing the progress in detail in these years. We again give the amounts in sterling money at two shillings the rupee :—

Value of the Imports into India from the United Kingdom and other Countries, from 1834-35 to 1849-50.

Years.	MERCHANDIZE.			Treasure.
	United Kingdom.	Other Countries.	Total.	
1834—35	£ 2,682,221	£ 1,578,884	£ 4,261,105	£ 1,893,023
1835—36	3,135,410	1,646,437	4,781,847	2,146,465
1836—37	3,830,504	1,706,486	5,536,990	2,036,167
1837—38	3,210,663	1,821,807	5,032,470	2,640,101
1838—39	3,505,930	1,734,746	5,240,676	3,010,919
1839—40	4,289,489	1,541,747	5,831,236	1,945,264
1840—41	6,014,339	2,401,600	8,415,939	1,786,253
1841—42	5,439,564	2,349,000	7,788,564	1,841,335
1842—43	5,354,901	2,248,701	7,603,602	3,443,291
1843—44	6,347,349	2,470,448	8,817,797	4,794,678
1844—45	7,952,179	2,801,886	10,754,065	3,752,471
1845—46	6,477,143	2,610,336	9,087,479	2,495,958
1846—47	6,420,404	2,476,260	8,896,664	2,939,922
1847—48	5,790,223	2,807,388	8,597,616	1,973,391
1848—49	5,512,110	2,832,693	8,344,803	4,204,503
1849—50	7,578,980	2,720,907	10,299,887	3,396,807

Value of the Exports into the United Kingdom and other Countries in each year, from 1834-35 to 1849-50.

Years.	MERCHANDIZE.			Treasure.
	United Kingdom.	Other Countries.	Total.	
1834—35	£ 3,056,973	£ 4,936,447	£ 7,993,420	£ 194,740
1835—36	3,975,303	7,131,194	11,106,497	108,109
1836—37	4,915,470	8,324,713	13,240,183	263,934
1837—38	4,353,822	6,888,958	11,242,780	340,656
1838—39	4,513,159	7,261,610	11,774,769	347,905
1839—40	5,969,951	4,892,793	10,862,744	470,523
1840—41	7,054,388	6,401,196	13,455,584	366,485
1841—42	7,120,748	6,704,469	13,825,217	515,075
1842—43	5,820,965	7,730,858	13,551,823	215,796
1843—44	7,760,128	9,493,343	17,253,476	746,076
1844—45	7,240,619	9,349,592	16,590,211	1,106,840
1845—46	6,658,943	10,369,730	17,028,673	816,028
1846—47	6,511,686	8,843,751	15,355,437	713,869
1847—48	5,683,826	7,628,570	13,312,396	1,426,038
1848—49	6,191,959	9,896,542	16,088,501	2,539,742
1849—50	7,026,470	10,285,828	17,312,298	971,244

Continuing this table with the details of trade with the United Kingdom for the succeeding six years, we have the following results :—

Value of the Imports from the United Kingdom and other Countries in each year, from 1850-51 to 1855-56.

Years.	MERCHANDIZE.			Treasure.
	United Kingdom.	Other Countries.	Total.	
1850-51.	£	£	£	£
Bengal.....	5,274,930	1,378,794	6,653,724	1,149,233
Madras.....	545,648	808,844	1,354,492	604,243
Bombay.....	2,838,189	3,491,341	6,329,530	2,399,530
	8,658,767	5,678,979	14,337,746	4,153,006
1851-52.				
Bengal.....	5,965,218	1,428,073	7,493,291	2,496,315
Madras.....	511,246	831,007	1,342,253	617,914
Bombay.....	2,655,613	3,207,732	5,863,345	2,459,082
	9,132,077	5,466,812	14,698,889	5,573,311
1852-53.				
Bengal.....	4,502,610	1,030,950	5,533,560	3,496,623
Madras.....	489,415	838,345	1,327,760	1,087,811
Bombay.....	2,642,515	3,502,706	6,145,222	2,866,703
	7,634,540	5,372,001	13,006,542	7,451,137
1853-54.				
Bengal.....	5,137,117	930,447	6,067,564	2,152,322
Madras.....	650,012	985,221	1,635,223	1,106,029
Bombay.....	2,955,107	3,219,716	6,174,824	2,263,538
	8,742,236	5,135,384	13,877,611	5,521,889
1854-55.				
Bengal.....	5,343,338	1,720,034	7,063,372	694,886
Madras.....	792,338	1,120,158	1,912,496	648,195
Bombay.....	3,426,239	3,061,507	6,487,747	1,337,478
	9,561,915	5,901,699	15,463,615	2,680,559
1855-56.				
Bengal.....	6,692,294	1,664,523	8,356,717	6,011,225
Madras.....	981,231	1,132,156	2,313,387	1,371,669
Bombay.....	2,999,420	3,704,502	6,603,923	4,973,380
	10,672,945	6,501,181	17,274,027	12,356,274

Value of the Exports to the United Kingdom and other Countries in each year, from 1850-51 to 1855-56.

Years.	MERCHANDIZE.			Treasure.
	United Kingdom.	Other Countries.	Total.	
1850-51.	£	£	£	£
Bengal.....	4,937,470	5,512,476	10,449,946	278,142
Madras	752,664	1,811,118	2,563,782	119,769
Bombay	2,406,554	4,958,344	7,364,898	654,674
	8,096,688	12,281,938	20,378,626	1,052,585
1851-52.				
Bengal.....	4,937,470	5,512,476	10,449,946	278,142
Madras	697,589	1,798,933	2,496,522	234,269
Bombay	1,647,430	6,887,969	8,535,399	955,396
	7,282,489	14,199,378	21,481,867	1,467,807
1852-53.				
Bengal.....	4,377,834	6,836,261	11,214,095	507,997
Madras ...	1,101,588	2,183,460	3,285,048	415,383
Bombay	2,938,595	5,426,742	8,365,337	1,092,323
	8,418,017	14,446,463	22,864,480	2,015,693
1853-54.				
Bengal.....	3,803,142	7,258,013	11,061,155	485,069
Madras	1,046,902	1,950,833	2,997,735	1,069,482
Bombay	2,655,482	5,327,011	7,982,493	1,524,695
	7,505,526	14,535,857	22,041,383	3,079,246
1854-55.				
Bengal.....	3,877,568	7,638,765	11,516,633	551,011
Madras	697,979	1,696,829	2,394,808	810,043
Bombay	2,363,468	5,102,314	7,465,782	704,099
	6,939,015	14,437,908	21,012,223	2,065,155
1855-56.				
Bengal.....	4,943,547	8,689,483	13,633,030	255,361
Madras	975,221	1,941,869	2,917,090	441,875
Bombay	3,413,780	5,529,118	8,943,898	1,349,016
	9,332,548	16,160,470	25,494,018	2,046,252

And the following is a memorandum of some of the items included in the trade from Bengal to other countries than Great Britain, as taken from Mr. Bonnaud's *Commercial Annual* of Calcutta:—

MERCHANDIZE. FRANCE.

	Imports.		Exports.
1854-55.....	£ 139,494	£ 437,975
1855-56.....	£ 249,496	£ 753,772

NORTH AMERICA.

	<i>Imports.</i>	<i>Exports.</i>
1854-55.....	£ 120,154	£ 876,508
1855-56.....	£ 89,548	£ 1,033,840

CHINA.

1854-55.....	£ 240,395	£ 3,306,621
1855-56.....	£ 201,562	£ 3,284,884

NEW HOLLAND AND SYDNEY.

1854-55.....	£ 51,483	£ 116,178
1855-56.....	£ 34,796	£ 148,786

SINGAPORE.

1854-55.....	£ 81,958	£ 501,793
1855-56.....	£ 80,830	£ 572,158

ARABIAN AND PERSIAN GULFS.

1854-55.....	£ 75,136	£ 106,457
1855-56.....	£ 65,517	£ 108,467

MADRAS AND COROMANDEL COAST.

1854-55	£ 125,510	£ 221,282
1855-56.....	£ 104,547	£ 185,574

BOMBAY AND MALABAR COAST.

1854-55.....	£ 207,644	£ 472,781
1855-56.....	£ 210,576	£ 456,657

PEGU.

1854-55.....	£ 102,064	£ 305,926
1855-56.....	£ 95,131	£ 378,810

MAURITIUS.

1854-55.....	£ 5,377	£ 202,279
1855-56.....	£ 3,923	£ 193,409

BOURBON.

1854-55.....	£ 5,097	£ 87,206
1855-56.....	£ 3,918	£ 171,478

Having regard in the foregoing tables to the official values as therein recorded, and not to the actual values and the charges which have to be added to the real values of the Exports, it might appear that the balance of trade to Great Britain was against India. But a consideration of the whole case will alter that opinion. And it is manifest as to other countries, that a very large amount has to be paid to India in Bullion, or other remittances, beyond the Merchandize imported. This would be

still more plain, were we to enter into the details of the trade of the other Presidencies; particularly that of Bombay with China.

The question then occurs, how these payments are in fact made? The answer seems to be that by Exchange operations, negotiated chiefly in Great Britain, the balance is adjusted by the remittances of the Company's Bills to the amount of about three millions and a half annually, and by extensive Shipments of Treasure. In effect, as to China, Great Britain pays India for the Opium exported thither. The Chinese ship to Great Britain, Tea and Silk, to a great amount, without taking anything like a corresponding amount of British Manufacture in return. They receive their payment for these Exports to a large extent, in the seventy thousand chests of Opium they import. In other words, the British Importer of Silk and Tea provides in return, Opium, for which he must pay India in Merchandize, the Company's Bills, or Treasure. If to this branch of the trade we add the consideration of the balances which have to be adjusted between India and France, the United States, Australia, Mauritius, Bourbon, and Singapore, we shall not be surprised at the increasing Import of Treasure into India, but rather may reasonably anticipate both a continuance and augmentation of it.

A very curious and interesting subject remains, in the consideration of the progress made in the export of particular articles. The Appendix to the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, from which we took the account of the tonnage, has some tables which shew both the quantities received at Calcutta from the interior of the Presidency of Bengal; and the quantities exported, in some instances, as far back as 1795.

The following are some of the results :—

COTTON.

Received.

1812-13 (the earliest return of the quantity received)	} Cwts.*75,086 about 3,750 tons.		
1817-18.....	783,411	„ 39,000	„
1822-23.....	158,167	„ 8,000	„
1827-28.....	566,852	„ 28,000	„
1829-30 (the latest return)	202,974	or 10,000	„

The largest export seems to have been in 1826-27, namely

* The return is given in Cwts. of eighty-two Bazar Maunds, or seventy eight Factory Maunds, to the Cwt.

365,639 Cwts. or about 18,000 tons—a large part being for China.

Gunnies and Gunny Bags.

1812-13	4,334,288 pieces.
1817-18	5,743,005 "
1822-23	3,228,451 "
1827-28	5,031,133 "
1829-30 (the latest return)	5,238,142 "

The return of exports extends back to 1795-96, and presents the following result :—

1795-96	100,375 pieces
1799-1800	142,575 "

Then till 1823-24, the number of bales only is mentioned, and it affords no certain test ; but the detail of pieces is resumed in 1823-24, and the totals, after that year, are thus stated :—

1823-24	609,040 pieces.
1824-25	711,315 "
1825-26	1,105,148 "
1826-27	1,420,804 "
1827-28	819,483 "
1828	1,013,277 "
1829	9,006,415 "

LAC OF SORTS.

Including, apparently, Lac Lake, Lac Dye, Shell Lac, Stick Lac, and Seed Lac.

Received at Calcutta.

1812-13	13,125 cwts.
1817-18	16,205 "
1822-23	5,986 "
1827-28	9,586 "
1829-30 (the latest return)	14,596 "

The Exports were :—

1795 of Lac and Shell Lac . . 50 maunds (of 82 lbs. to the maund.)
1799-1800 of all kinds . . 5,212 maunds.

Then there is no return till 1823-24, when 14,190 maunds of Lac and Shell Lac were exported. In 1828-29, the amount was 18,965 maunds of Lac and Shell Lac, and 1,985 of Stick Lac, and Seed Lac.

There is no account of the quantity of Jute received—but the quantity exported is mentioned in 1795-96 as 1,780 maunds, then there is no record of any other shipment, till 1826, when 6,061

maunds were exported, and in 1828-29, the quantity reached 14,565 maunds.

The following are notes of other articles now in extensive request :—

Received at Calcutta.

CASTOR OIL.

1823-24 (the first return)	3,508	cwts.
1825-26	8,818	"
1829-30 (the last return in this series)	4,313	"

OIL SEEDS.

1813-14 (the first return)	241,798	cwts.
1819-20	292,470	"
1823-24	289,332	"
1829-30	367,249	"

OPIUM.

1819 (the first return)	4,069	chests.
1824-25	7,390	"
1828-29	7,709	"
1829-30	8,778	"

SAFFLOWER.

1812 (first return)	3,079	cwts.
1817	2,350	"
1822-23	8,417	"
1827-28	3,692	"
1829-30	2,299	"

SALTPETRE.

1812-13	17,899	cwts.
1817-18	127,315	"
1822-23	198,871	"
1827-28	224,902	"
1829-30	235,712	"

SEEDS OF SORTS.

1812-13	292,025	cwts.
1817-18	25,800	"
1822-23	19,234	"
1827-28	15,498	"
1829-30	16,519	"

SILK.

1812-13 (the first return)	7,996	cwts.
1817-18	6,861	"
1822-23	12,456	"
1827-28	12,654	"
1829-30	13,054	"

SUGAR.

1812-13 (the first return)	120,180	cwts.
1817-18	345,273	"
1822-23	293,508	"
1827-28	197,702	"
1829-30	366,239	"

Of some articles the value only could be given. Among these, were Skins and Hides. The value of the quantities that were received at Calcutta was 290,049 Sicca Rupees, in 1823-24. equivalent then, to more than £30,000. Afterwards the value fell, and in 1829-30, it was only 94,000 rupees, or about £10,000.

The quantities exported of these articles may be stated as follows, as far as the tables afford information :—

SEEDS (*apparently all kinds except Indigo Seed.*)

1795-96 (the first return)	2,192	mds.
1823-24	1,295	"
1828-29	5,919	"
1829-30	2,939	"

The returns are imperfect from 1799-1800 to 1823-24, and it is not stated, if these are Bazar or Factory Maunds.

OPIUM.

1795-96 (the first return)	5,183	chests.
1800-1	4,788	"
1805-6	3,567	"
1810-11	4,909	"
1815-16	3,848	"
1820-21	5,147	"
1825-26	5,155	"
1829-30	9,678	"

SAFFLOWER.

1823-24 (the first return)	8,378	mds.
1828-29	3,040	"
1829-30	2,455	"

SALTPETRE.

1795	13,175	bags.
1800-1	25,188	"
1805-6	24,301	"
1810-11	947	"
1815-16	62,630	"
1820-21	175,143	"
1825	152,162	"
1829-30	176,062	"

SILK.

1795-96	109 mds.
1799-1800	1,899 „

The returns are incomplete till

1823-24	11,579 mds.
1828-29	18,724 „
1829-30	16,045 „

SUGAR.

1795.....	110,800 Bz. mds. of 82 lbs.
1799.....	240,004 „

The returns here also are incomplete.

1823-24.....	275,288 Bz. mds.
1828-29.....	361,871 „
1829-30.....	181,799 „

It would lead us into needless and excessive minuteness to enter into the details of other Presidencies. But as to Bengal, with a view to a fair comparison of progress in recent years, we may state some data as given by Mr. Bell, in the order in which he places them. We omit Indigo, because the production for many years has not substantially varied, except by the fluctuation of the seasons; and it may be doubted, if there is the prospect of a largely increased demand for it from Bengal.

SUGAR EXPORTED.

1824-25	226,047 Bz. mds. value £	189,657
1825-26	191,146 „	153,103
1826-27	229,494 „	184,371
1827-28	105,346 „	84,482
1828-29	251,977 „	206,333

SALTPETRE.

1824-25	179,966 Bz. mds.	£ 101,225
1825-26	295,208 „	172,007
1826-27	293,999 „	170,677
1827-28	302,659 „	180,685
1828-29	260,611 „	100,219

RAW COTTON.

1824-25	119,315 Bz. mds.	£ 119,318
1825-26	92,879 „	92,882
1826-27	183,935 „	183,935
1827-28	6,717 „	6,576
1828-29	25,256 „	20,129

RAW SILK.

1824-25	4,815	Bz. mds.	£	123,933
1825-26	6,045	"		158,696
1826-27	2,734	"		71,916
1827-28	2,496	"		65,095
1828-29	6,543	"		178,152

LAC DYE.

1824-25	8,663	Bz. mds.	£	79,137
1825-26	9,308	"		80,071
1826-27	8,975	"		82,092
1827-28	9,046	"		73,722
1828-29	7,264	"		47,399

SHELL LAC.

1824-25	10,742	Bz. mds.	£	18,564
1825-26	9,053	"		16,832
1826-27	3,815	"		7,670
1827-28	5,542	"		10,868
1828-29	8,399	"		15,656

OPIUM.

1824-25	6,850	Chests.	£	876,669
1825-26	4,833	"		798,132
1826-27	5,462	"		872,989
1827-28	7,377	"		1,122,889
1828-29	7,324	"		1,049,649

SAFFLOWER.

1824-25	8,448	Bz. mds.	£	29,065
1825-26	7,100	"		24,515
1826-27	3,461	"		7,397
1827-28	1,801	"		3,546
1828-29	2,271	"		5,607

CASTOR OIL.

1824-25	2,762	Bz. mds.	£	4,202
1825-26	2,914	"		5,157
1826-27	1,188	"		2,108
1827-28	1,285	"		2,147
1828-29	3,179	"		4,941

GRAIN, INCLUDING RICE, WHEAT, AND PADDY.

1824-25	1,279,934	Bz. mds.	£	224,163
1825-26	1,611,023	"		233,573
1826-27	1,027,949	"		176,845
1827-28	1,239,728	"		201,173
1828-29	1,227,237	"		210,574

GUNNY AND GUNNY BAGS.

1824-25.....	935,245	pieces	£ 7,006
1825-26.....	1,965,442	„	16,215
1826-27.....	2,183,098	„	16,845
1827-28.....	1,343,129	„	13,277
1828-29.....	2,205,206	„	16,610

HIDES AND SKINS.

1824-25.....	377,294	pieces	£9,414
1825-26.....	322,391	„	9,334
1826-27.....	18,043	„	1,022
1827-28.....	48,530	„	2,227
1828-29.....	264,672	„	3,551

All the preceding tabular calculations are based on two shillings to a rupee; but as the rupees up to 1836 were Sicca Rupees (worth about 6 per cent. more than the Company's), and the exchange at times carried a rupee nearly up to two shillings and six pence, some considerable additions may be made to the amounts we have given. Perhaps twenty per cent. for the whole period will be an excessive average to add; but the table which we next present, (even if that valuation be made of the preceding shipments from 1792), will scarcely exhibit a less striking contrast. The tables we propose to give include all the articles we have just been considering, and for all the range of years from 1833 to 1856, two shillings was a fair average for the rupee.

CASTOR OIL.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds....*6,091	Maunds .. 11,463	Maunds .. 12,435
Value.....£9,349	Value£17,101	Value£16,748
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds .. 11,267	Maunds .. 22,701	Maunds .. 21,733
Value£11,259	Value£22,700	Value£21,732
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds .. 19,011	Maunds ... 25,370	Maunds .. 44,702
Value£13,323	Value£18,655	Value£35,774

RAW COTTON.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds.. 143,555	Maunds... 336,827	Maunds .. 583,762
Value ..£143,250	Value£314,613	Value£587,292
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 201,457	Maunds... 201,874	Maunds.. 93,771
Value ...£202,514	Value£201,874	Value.....£ 93,516

* These are all Indian maunds of eighty pounds.

1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds.. 199,558	Maunds.. 91,347	Maunds... 173,908
Value ...£199,363	Value... £91,353	Value£173,853

LAC DYE.

1833-34.	1834-35	1835-36.
Maunds.... 9,590	Maunds..... 8,390	Maunds..... 12,066
Value£22,216	Value£19,692	Value£31,603
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds..... 16,881	Maunds.... 22,352	Maunds.... 17,934
Value£25,201	Value £44,213	Value£35,841
1853-34.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds..... 35,481	Maunds..... 17,525	Maunds..... 27,995
Value£88,594	Value£46,078	Value£81,591

LAC (SHELL.)

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds..... 26,056	Maunds..... 19,890	Maunds..... 33,935
Value£60,412	Value£47,384	Value£72,409
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds..... 38,446	Maunds..... 42,626	Maunds..... 33,179
Value£30,857	Value£38,196	Value£29,919
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds.....55,272	Maunds..... 47,225	Maunds..... 47,974
Value£50,931	Value£42,491	Value£43,458

LAC (STICK.)

1833-34.	1834-35	1835-36.
Maunds 104	Maunds 82	Maunds.... 1,470
Value £ 199	Value£ 85	Value£ 1,570
1843-34.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds 770	Maunds 313	Maunds 831
Value£ 269	Value£ 109	Value£ 288
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds 748	Maunds.... 1,574	Maunds ... 1,606
Value£ 429	Value £1,036	Value£1,263

GUNNIES' CLOTHS AND BAGS.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Pieces ... 2,615,975	Pieces... 2,442,109	Pieces ... 2,287,893
Value ...£ 19,567	Value...£ 19,835	Value ...£ 24,094

1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Pieces .. 5,761,424	Pieces .. 6,041,483	Pieces... 5,819,610
Value .. £68,849	Value ... £76,213	Value... £69,235
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Pieces... 14,460,461	Pieces... 11,162,170	Pieces... 20,221,016
Value... £249,534	Value... £297,456	Value... £130,732

HIDES AND SKINS.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Pieces... 1,251,577	Pieces... 1,146,782	Pieces... 1,549,492
Value ... £60,004	Value... £78,861	Value ... £98,747
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Pieces... 2,760,691	Pieces... 3,127,250	Pieces... 2,872,018
Value... £259,348	Value... £263,978	Value ... £237,875
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Pieces... 5,059,263	Pieces... 4,658,199	Pieces... 4,788,129
Value... £360,502	Value... £348,522	Value... £368,888

JUTE.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds... 67,805	Maunds... 33,851	Maunds... 16,916
Value..... £12,619	Value.... £5,610	Value..... £3,463
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 294,599	Maunds... 352,705	Maunds... 293,497
Value.... £55,293	Value..... £57,562	Value..... £45,518
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 660,548	Maunds... 904,002	Maunds... 1,194,470
Value ...£155,715	Value ...£227,721	Value.. £327,476

LINSEED.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Nil.	Maunds... 77,791	Maunds... 163,190
„	Value.... £16,412	Value.. ... £33,603
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 210,026	Maunds... 244,785	Maunds .. 255,926
Value..... £42,003	Value..... £48,975	Value..... £51,188
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 982,399	Maunds. 2,436,326	Maunds. 2,538,225
Value ...£196,492	Value... £487,267	Value... £507,824

MUSTARD SEED.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Nil.	Nil.	Nil.
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 52,037	Maunds... 61,671	Maunds ... 120,202
Value..... £10,407	Value..... £12,334	Value ... £24,019
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 202,026	Maunds... 575,453	Maunds. 1,307,115
Value..... £40,520	Value ...£103,086	Value... £261,541

POPPY SEED.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Nil.	Nil.	Nil.
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Nil.	Nil.	Nil.
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 65,986	Maunds... 133,170	Maunds... 114,526
Value..... £13,257	Value..... £26,634	Value..... £22,932

OPIUM.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Chests... 12,006	Chests... 10,995	Chests... 14,851
Value...£1,240,382	Value...£1,079,549	Value... £1,765,768
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Chests... 17,774	Chests... 18,792	Chests ... 20,481
Value.. £2,338,305	Value... £2,439,429	Value...£2,795,966
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Chests... 40,787	Chests... 51,421	Chests ... 44,937
Value...£3,690,208	Value...£3,694,816	Value...£3,638,917

RICE.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds . 2,667,465	Maunds . 2,126,978	Maunds . 1,455,316
Value£461,455	Value ... £322,269	Value£172,745
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 2,454,352	Maunds . 2,377,565	Maunds . 3,443,223
Value£337,879	Value..... £339,405	Value£543,639
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds . 4,380,903	Maunds . 5,273,964	Maunds 9,187,259
Value£518,384	Value..... £567,455	Value ...£1,047,133

WHEAT.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds... 114,365	Maunds... 211,776	Maunds... 201,238
Value..... £16,400	Value £28,587	Value..... £27,147
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 137,139	Maunds... 164,022	Maunds... 187,414
Value..... £ 21,458	Value ... £24,564	Value ... £29,701
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 252,314	Maunds... 462,078	Maunds... 950,036
Value ... £28,978	Value..... £48,739	Value ... £100,469

OTHER GRAIN.

Paddy, Gram, Dholl and Peas, Oats, Flour, Barley, and Bran.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds... 137,673	Maunds... 175,414	Maunds... 72,570
Value ... £27,040	Value ... £31,587	Value ... £10,240
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 148,127	Maunds... 129,532	Maunds... 176,464
Value..... £22,260	Value..... £16,351	Value ... £24,963
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 238,425	Maunds... 563,142	Maunds... 665,558
Value..... £36,000	Value ... £58,593	Value £59,420

SAFFLOWER.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds... 7,630	Maunds... 8,490	Maunds... 7,801
Value..... £18,763	Value..... £20,580	Value £18,225
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds..... 5,858	Maunds... 11,323	Maunds... 20,298
Value..... £8,202	Value..... £21,939	Value..... £42,184
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 27,491	Maunds... 26,179	Maunds... 15,495
Value..... £68,684	Value..... £68,270	Value..... £30,766

SALTPETRE.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds... 490,554	Maunds... 368,308	Maunds... 408,001
Value ... £254,801	Value..... £187,003	Value £203,079
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds... 514,011	Maunds... 586,976	Maunds... 618,560
Value..... £270,145	Value..... £316,003	Value £350,649

1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 872,886	Maunds... 796,243	Maunds... 737,273
Value.....£497,950	Value£458,109	Value£423,406

SUGAR.

1833-34.	1834-35.	1835-36.
Maunds... 290,363	Maunds... 358,515	Maunds... 368,760
Value.....£230,822	Value£279,059	Value£285,215
1843-44.	1844-45.	1845-46.
Maunds . 1,524,548	Maunds . 1,539,117	Maunds . 1,893,937
Value...£1,460,464	Value... £1,469,195	Value £1,789,318
1853-54.	1854-55.	1855-56.
Maunds... 942,391	Maunds . 1,212,077	Maunds . 1,221,393
Value£844,738	Value...£1,123,507	Value..£1,134,154

These figures will show the expansive power of the Bengal trade. In respect of Sugar in particular, it is probable, that had not slave-grown sugar been admitted into the United Kingdom, the annual export would, by this time, have reached the value of five millions sterling, with the prospect and capability of an indefinite increase. In other articles, (Seeds, Jute, Saltpetre, Opium, and Rice), it will be seen that the increase has already been extraordinary. In some years, a sudden increase, consequent on an unexpected demand, has occurred in articles which previously scarcely appeared to be staple products, and the demand has been rapidly met; and so it certainly would be with other articles. The continuance of the Russian war for another year or two, would probably have caused the Export of Hemp, which, in 1854-55, only amounted to £7,300, and rose in 1853-54 (in Hemp and Hemp Twine), to £35,000, and in 1854-55 to £38,000, to become one of the most important branches of trade.

The case of Silk requires special notice. Mr. Bell, in his retrospective view in the work we have already quoted, says: "It is not sufficiently known, that the trade in Bengal Silk, both in its raw and manufactured state, has been almost entirely engrossed by the Company; or at least that portion which falls to the lot of private individuals, has been so much enhanced by the powerful facilities of the former, that as an object of commercial gain, it is impossible to stand the test of competition. It is not difficult to foresee the result which is likely to crown this system of unprofitable trade, pursued with so much avidity by the agents of the Company, who being remunerated in proportion to the quantity of Raw Silk provided, have at once the power of crushing all private enterprise, and, by setting up a strong competition

among themselves, have raised the price to double of what it ought to be and might be."

The effects of this, alike on the manufacturer at home and the trade of India, were manifest. The export we have seen in 1828-29 was 6,543 maunds at a cost of £178,152. The subsequent course of trade was as follows: the Company's trade continuing for a few years with a view to its final extinction.

1833-34.		1834-35.		1835-36.	
Private	3,280 Mds.	Private	6,176 Mds.	Private	10,494 Mds.
Co.'s	10,269 "	Co.'s	8,022 "	Co.'s	4,139 "
	<u>13,549 "</u>		<u>14,198 "</u>		<u>14,633 "</u>
Value...£376,919		Value...£376,927		Value...£384,852	

Company's trade terminated.

1843-44.		1844-45.		1845-46.	
Maunds.....	21,284	Maunds.....	22,343	Maunds.....	19,160
Value	£836,954	Value	£896,008	Value	£764,346
1853-54.		1854-55.		1855-56.	
Maunds.....	20,280	Maunds.....	15,109	Maunds.....	18,229
Value	£831,567	Value	£545,671	Value	£703,822

Here then we see a rising demand, a corresponding supply, higher prices, and profits diffused not among a few commercial agents and their subordinates, to the loss of the East India Company, (as was the case formerly), but among the producers and the legitimate traders.

We cannot in the limits of this review enter more largely into the details of the Bengal trade. But the more salient points may be mentioned; and first as to Arracan. It was a swamp, almost useless and valueless, when first annexed, after the first Burmese war, thirty years ago. Its exports in 1854-55 were £571,473, and in 1855-56 were £1,072,921, almost entirely in Rice:—importing in payment very little besides silver, and that principally through Calcutta.

The *character* of the trade of Calcutta has undoubtedly greatly improved. Private trade by Englishmen was commenced chiefly by Civil Servants and Officers of the Company, who preferred mercantile pursuits and became Bankers or Agents. For many years nearly the whole of the private trade was carried on by their firms, called the Great Houses, and it appeared to be of the most princely and prosperous character. Many partners died very rich, many retired home and occupied positions of great influence, and the establishments both in England and in Calcutta were conducted with a lavish, and perhaps unrivalled mag-

nificence and extravagance. It was usual to make the partners' trustees in all the settlements of their constituents, and great numbers of the servants of government retired home, leaving their fortunes in the hands of those agents, bearing high interest. The first blow to the system occurred on the failure of the greatest of all the firms, Palmer and Co. The others followed in a few years; the aggregate liabilities of the whole of the six houses being fifteen millions sterling. The regime that succeeded was not much, if at all, better. The chief motive power to a considerable portion of the trade, was the Union Bank, which was started with a paid up capital of a million. In 1847, it failed, after having sacrificed that million, and half a million more belonging to depositors and others, in support of five or six other houses whose ruin had preceded its own, or immediately followed as a necessary consequence on its downfall. We have nothing whatever to retract from the statements and sentiments contained in our paper on this whole subject in this *Review*, for April, 1848,* nor do we think that the lessons of that time have hitherto been so perfectly learned, as to render all present reference to them superfluous and unnecessary. It is, we conceive, certain, that nothing occurred in the management at home, of Sir J. D. Paul's Bank, the Royal British Bank, or the London and Eastern Bank, (the management of which has led to the necessity for new and more stringent legislation), which had not in its parallel in the commercial proceedings of many in Calcutta, in the ten years preceding 1848. And if it be right now, for the press in England, to expose that management there, it was equally the duty of the press here, to expose those proceedings here. But we rejoice to know that a far better state of things has followed. There are not a few houses here now, (both British and Foreign) based on large capital, connected with capitalists elsewhere, managed by able and judicious men;—houses as different as it is possible to be, from those of former years, whose extravagance and folly were only equalled by their arrogance and emptiness. The trade here consequently is animated by the genuine spirit of commercial enterprise: enterprise regulated by prudence, and not stimulated to wild speculation by artificial credit. It is a trade expanding with the success of its traders in due proportion and measure; sound, we believe, as the trade of any place that can be mentioned; and destined, we doubt not, to an immense and incalculable advancement. We have seen an end of the days of excessive expenditure, by houses whose insolvency was notorious. But there is still need for peculiar caution, for the fact is noto-

* *Calcutta Review*, No. xvii, Commercial Morality.

rious, (however it may be accounted for), that very few merchants have retired from Calcutta with any considerable fortunes during the last twenty years.

It is obvious, that in the course of years, the natives of Calcutta, with rapidly increasing wealth and intelligence, will take a more direct and important part in the trade of the country. There are certainly difficulties in their way, but gradually they may be overcome. At present, it is evident that confidence is and must be limited. Public opinion in native society does not punish fraud; the capital of the native trader can always be placed out of sight, when convenient, by pretended sales and transfers, which it is extremely difficult for an European to trace and to detect. And then, too, the almost universal disregard of truth by the natives, and the entire inability of the European to judge with certainty of the actual character and capital of the natives, (from whose social habits and connections, he is so completely estranged,) are causes which introduce into all commercial dealings with them, a painful and continual consciousness of insecurity. But these difficulties may diminish, as experience and civilization prevail; and we hope that higher influences may elevate the native character, and introduce therefore a new element into the trade of India. We may then confidently expect, not only a powerful and wholesome competition with the European merchant, but also an important addition to the development of the resources of the country.

It is also probable, that the natives of the Inner Provinces of Bengal will gradually become more largely embarked in commerce. There is no doubt, that Brahminism is breaking down; education is slowly but surely spreading; the means of intercommunication will increase; new outlets for remote districts will be opened; and the Bengali is by nature an accountant and trader. His soil possesses exuberant fertility; there is an immense extent still untouched by the plough, and untrodden by the foot of man; and there is a population available for every new sphere of labour and profit. It is found already, that the labourers of Eastern Bengal are flocking down to the "Rice Diggings" in Arracan, and returning to enrich their families. A new and most interesting opening of another kind will soon be afforded on the Mutlah. It may be admitted that the dangers of the Hooghly are exaggerated, and that very few vessels under steam have ever been injured there in passing up and down; but the moorings and the stream of Calcutta are hazardous in the freshes, and they will not suffice, if the 1,134 Square Rigged vessels of 1855-56 are increased to 2,000. The city is in fact confined; the canal approach to it is insufficient; and when the railway is opened from the North West, and begins to bring down in increased quantities the products of the interior, there will not be room enough on

the shores on either side of the river for the growing traffic. The proposed new port on the Mutlah, (a branch of the sea running up to an excellent anchorage at about twenty-six miles from Calcutta), is therefore a necessity, and the Railroad to it no less. If that scheme, (already far advanced, and already sufficiently tested by the experiment of Borradaile and Co.,) be carried out with vigour, there will be a new city with its docks, its wharves, and its shipping; a new centre of influence and enterprise; the cultivation of the Sunderbunds with its seven thousand square miles of invaluable soil, now covered with jungle, will produce rice, cotton, and all other native products, in close proximity to the new demand; there will be easy access to the Eastern districts; and an impulse will be given to the commerce of Bengal, exceeding every thing since the Charter Act of 1813, whereby the monopoly of India's trade was abolished.

Another immediate prospect is the developement of the North Western Provinces. Nothing more remarkable than the steady progress of those Provinces, has occurred in recent years in India. The fruits of Mr. Thomason's long period of wise, and systematic, and vigorous Government; the zeal, and energy, and ability of some of the officers of Government there; the animating influence of Mr. Colvin, the present Governor, and his hearty encouragement of all that tends to rouse the people, to improve their condition, and to add force and effectiveness to the administration of public affairs, and the hope of a very early opening of the Railway from Allahabad to Delhi, (long anterior to its completion from Calcutta to Benares)—all tend to the conviction, that very soon the North Western Provinces will become the most active seats of commerce in the empire. The proposition that has been made for a Railway from Cawnpore to Lucknow, and thence through Rohilcund to Bareilly, and other adjacent stations, should, we conceive, meet the unhesitating support of the Court of Directors. The Railway from Mirzapore to Jubbulpore and thence to Bombay, is sanctioned, and will become of immense importance. That from Bombay to Agra, is in progress. It is intended to continue the Delhi line to Peshawar. The occupation of Oude renders the navigation of the Gogra, one of the most interesting and promising openings in the country. The iron discovered in Kumaon, from its great value, indicates the necessity of roads to communicate with the Rohilcund Railway. The cultivation of Tea in the North West, and of Tea and Flax in the Punjab, the mineral resources of the Nerbudda valley, the access by the Railway and though cross roads to Saugor, Bundelkund, Nagpore, and parts of the Nizam's dominions, will afford to the people of our Upper Provinces the assurance of a vast increase of resources. We believe too, that

the prospect to which we have before adverted—the influence of all this stir and progress on the surrounding tribes of Asia, in a few years of peace, will be powerfully felt, and that the result will be the discovery of other resources, of which, at present, we can form no conception, and the civilization of races of men who are among the noblest of mankind.

The case of Bengal in its further details requires very special consideration. It is our belief that, with wonderful advantages, it has also remarkable disadvantages, and that it urgently requires careful and special enquiry. To this subject we must ask the attention of our readers; and we shall endeavour to state the case as simply as possible.

In the enquiry into Indian affairs by the House of Commons in 1853, the condition of the people was scarcely examined at all. But one witness of great weight and authority was examined on the point, and his evidence was of so much importance that we are compelled to quote it at length. That witness was Mr. R. D. Mangles, M. P., an East India Director, who is now Chairman of the E. I. Company, and who, while in India, held some of the highest offices under Government. His evidence was as follows:—

R. D. Mangles, Esq. examined—question put by the chairman, Mr. T. Baring:—

“It has been stated that the ryots are very poor; do you consider that their poverty and degradation should be ascribed to the land revenue system? In the first place, I think there is very great exaggeration with regard to the poverty of the ryots. I think it has been overstated to a very great extent. In Bengal, indeed, the Government is in no wise responsible for the condition of ryots, except in so far as, through the very unwise, though in intention benevolent measures of Lord Cornwallis, they have been handed over almost entirely to the Zemindars; but still, in Bengal, where the ryots are worse off, I believe, than any part of India, their condition is very much better, taken with reference to the nature of the climate, and the wants of the ryot, than is generally supposed. I believe the cultivators in the North Western Provinces are in a more comfortable condition than the peasantry of this, or perhaps of any other country, except America and Australia, and new countries of that description. I believe from what I can gather, that in Madras and Bombay their condition is very much better than has commonly been stated; but be their condition good or bad, I conceive the system of land revenue has nothing whatever to do with it, because, I believe, that where land is from social circumstances in a condition to yield rent, rent will be paid to some party or other, whether the Government take any share of it or not. The ryots would have to pay rent to somebody, if the Government took no share of that rent; and I do not believe that the payment of rent, if the demand of the Go-

vernment is confined to a share of the rent, as it certainly is in every part of India, as far as I know, can have any thing to do with the condition of the people. I believe the poverty of the agricultural population of India is much more attributable to social causes, to the great subdivision of property, and to the great number of people employed in raising the amount of produce, so that the produce is almost consumed by the people who raise it. I believe the great cause or instrument of agricultural wealth is to raise a large quantity of produce with the smallest possible number of hands. In India the state of things is precisely the reverse, and I believe that that, more than any other cause, has led to the comparative poverty of the ryots of India. In fact, the ryot of India is as nearly as possible in the position of the cottier of Ireland, and it is very remarkable that you might take a whole page from a work describing India, and take a whole page describing Ireland, and apply them by a mere mutation of names from one country to the other. * * * * *

"Does not it follow from this, that the poverty, however great it may be, is quite consistent with the contentment of the people?—Yes."

Question by the Hon'ble J. E. Elliot :*—

"You said that the ryots under the perpetual settlement had to shift for themselves : are they in a worse position than the lower class of those who have small holdings in this country ? I doubt if they are ; I said, I thought they were not so, taking into comparison the climate, and the nature of their wants, and all circumstances being considered."

Mr. Elliot.—"As far as the laws under which they live are concerned, have they not the same means of protecting themselves, as a tenant in this country has, who is oppressed by his landlord ? Certainly, the laws take as good care of them as laws can, I think."

"If they do suffer from extortion in any way, it is because they will not take those precautions which are provided for them, or else being of a more helpless nature than Englishmen are, they do not make the same resistance ?—Yes."

"But as far as the law is concerned, they have the power, if they choose, to exert themselves to obtain redress ? Certainly."

Question put by Hon'ble C. S. Hardinge.†

Mr. Hardinge.—"Can you compare the condition of the ryot in India with the condition of any European cultivators of land or laborers ? I think so ; the condition of ryots, under the worst circumstances, is marvellously like that of cottiers in Ireland. There is an article in the *Edinburgh Review* on Railways in Ireland, from which you might transfer whole pages to the condition of the ryot in India. The other day, I met Sir Thomas Redington, and without my expressing any opinion on the subject, he told me that he had been struck

* A retired Bengal Civilian.

† Private Secretary to Lord Hardinge, when Governor General.

with the similarity of what he had read of the condition of the ryot in India to the condition of the peasant in Ireland."

"Is not misery in Ireland somewhat different from the supposed misery in India, in as much as in Ireland a man is considered very poor, if he has not clothes to cover him, but in India a man is comparatively well off with hardly any? I said, considering the difference of the climate and their wants, I think that, under the worst circumstances, they are quite as well off. The circumstances which cause famine in India and in Ireland are precisely the same: each man depends upon the cultivation of his own little patch of land, and if that fails in any year, he has nothing to fall back on; when he has sold his cattle, and the gold ornaments of his wives and children, he must starve."

"Is not it the case, that the ryots want little, consume little, and wear little or no clothing? Yes; and I believe, circumstances considered, they are as well off as the population of the same class in any country in Europe."

Mr. Elliot.—"Is not it the case, that the houses of all the cultivators in the villages in Bengal are infinitely better than the common hovels and huts you see in many parts of England, and certainly, in Ireland and the North of Scotland? They are vastly better than they are in Ireland, and, considering the climate and the wants of the people, as good as in England. A Bengalee village is surrounded with Plantain Gardens, and with Cocanut Gardens, and Gardens for the cultivation of vegetables. I believe, having regard to their wants, they live in comfort and ease."

"Are not the huts themselves better? They are much better, without even allowing for the difference of climate. I have seen absolutely worse huts in Ireland than I have ever seen in India."

Mr. Hardinge.—"Is there not a great degree of neatness in Bengalee villages, as regards keeping up those huts; are they not swept clean, and made to present a comfortable appearance?—Very much so."

"They have always tanks to bathe in, have not they?—Yes."

Now in the petition of the Missionaries of Calcutta, which was printed and laid before that Committee, there was the following rather opposite statement:—

"That your Petitioners have reason to believe that there is a vast amount of social disorganization, and of consequent suffering, in the whole country. Much of this your Petitioners can trace to the fearful superstitions of the people; to their ignorance; and to the debasing effects of a popular mythology, which presents, as objects of worship, deities who are examples of every vice, and which ascribes sanctity and divine honour to a priesthood which is the principal curse of India. But speaking particularly of this great Presidency of Bengal, your Petitioners would represent to your Honorable House the existence of evils, which it falls properly within the scope of Government to meet and to control. The evils resulting from

the religions of the country, your Petitioners believe have been greatly diminished since the commencement of Christian Missions ; and they willingly accord to the Government of India the praise of having abolished Satis, and checked Infanticide, Thuggism and the once prevalent practice of self-immolation. Your Petitioners do not now hear of the terrible occurrences, with which their predecessors were familiar—of women drowning themselves publicly at the junction of the Ganges and the Jumna ; of others sitting in pits to be smothered by heavy baskets of sand ; and of devotees yielding themselves to death in the presence of multitudes, by means which require the active participation of heartless accessories. A more just apprehension of their duty by the Judicial Officers of Government has restrained such suicides, by dealing with the accessories, as guilty of murder ; and the enactment of several wise and salutary laws has restrained the other classes of crimes which your Petitioners have mentioned. Your Petitioners believe, however, that these results must, in a large measure, be ascribed to the growing influence of Christian Missions, which have been blessed, no less in raising the standard of piety and justice among the Europeans in India, than in the enlightenment of the consciences of the natives. But there are other evils with which the Government, as such, has to contend, and which your Petitioners regret to declare, appear to be on the increase. Your Petitioners greatly fear that it will be found, on enquiry, that in many districts of Bengal, neither life nor property is secure ; that gang-robberies of the most daring character are perpetrated annually in great numbers, with impunity ; and that there are constant scenes of violence, in contentions respecting disputed boundaries between the owners of landed estates.

“ That your Petitioners submit to your Honorable House that the radical cause of these evils is the inefficiency of the Police and the Judicial system. Your Petitioners find that the sole protection of the public peace, in many places, is a body of Policemen (called Village Chowkedars,) who are in fact the ministers of the most powerful of their neighbours, rather than the protectors of the people. The body of peace-officers appointed and paid directly by the State will, on enquiry, be found to be entirely insufficient for the great districts for which they are provided ; but few as they are, they, also, will be found to be oppressors of the people. The records of the criminal courts, and the experience of every resident in the districts of Bengal, will bear testimony to the facts that no confidence can be placed in the Police force (either the regular force or the Village Chowkedars) ; that it is their practice to extort confessions by torture ; and that, while they are powerless to resist the gangs of organized burglars or dacoits, they are corrupt enough to connive at their atrocities.

“ That your Petitioners believe that a strict and searching enquiry into the state of the rural population of Bengal would lead your Honorable House to the conclusion, that they commonly live in a state of poverty and wretchedness, produced chiefly by the present system of landed tenures and the extortion of Zemindars, aggra-

vated by the inefficiency and the cruelties of the peace-officers, who are paid by the Chowkedarry tax or by the Government.

"That your Petitioners believe that a well-organized Police, with a more extensive and more effective Judicial system, would do much to check the outrages that arise from disputes about land. But your Petitioners must also ascribe much of the evil which these outrages produce, to the causes by which primarily such disputes are occasioned. Your Petitioners must declare that, from the want of a complete survey of the estates of the country; of a Registration Act to settle titles; and of laws to obviate the infinite mischief of the universal system of Secret Trusts, there is so much uncertainty about the landed tenures and boundaries in Bengal, that capitalists generally dread to purchase such property, and those who do, too frequently keep bodies of club-men, to take and keep by force the extent of land to which they deem themselves entitled. Between contending proprietors; amidst scenes of constant conflict; and a prey to the corruption and the oppression of the Police; the tenant is reduced, not merely to beggary, but also in many cases, to a state of the most abject and pitiable servitude."

Subsequently, in the course of September 1856, the Missionaries memorialized the Hon'ble F. J. Halliday, the Lieut. Governor of Bengal, on the subject of a Commission to enquire into the condition of the people of Bengal. We give their words. After quoting the foregoing extract from their petition of 1852, they say:—

"That a separate Petition, signed by 1,800 Christian inhabitants of Bengal, was presented to Parliament in 1853, in which they stated that "the Police of the Lower Provinces totally fails as respects the prevention of crimes, apprehension of offenders, and protection of life and property; but it is become an engine of oppression and a great cause of the corruption of the people;" "that torture is believed to be extensively practised on persons under accusation:" and that "all the evil passions are brought into play, and ingenuities of all kinds, both by people and Police, are resorted to;" and this Petition also bore strong and emphatic testimony to the wretched condition of the people, and the unsatisfactory state of the Judicial system.

"That your Memorialists noticed with extreme regret that the Parliamentary inquiry into Indian affairs was brought to a close, before this subject of the social condition of the people was opened.

"That, since that period, many circumstances, and particularly many recent publications, have deepened the conviction of your Memorialists, that the social condition of the people of Bengal is deplorable in the extreme, and that the representations in their Petition fell short of the truth.

"That your Memorialists have perused with the deepest interest a Minute by your Honor, on the Police and Criminal Justice in Bengal, in which the existing system is most faithfully and powerfully described. Your Memorialists have noticed particularly the

following statements :—that “ for a long series of years, complaints have been handed down from administration to administration, regarding the badness of the Mofussil Police, under the Government of Bengal, and as yet very little has been done to improve it ;”—that “ throughout the length and breadth of the country, the strong prey almost universally upon the weak, and power is but too commonly valued, only as it can be turned into money :”—that “ it is a lamentable but unquestionable fact that the rural Police, its position, character and stability, as a public institution, have, in the Lower Provinces, deteriorated during the last twenty years ;”—that “ the Criminal Judicatories certainly do not command the confidence of the people ;”—that “ whether right or wrong, the general native opinion is certainly that the administration of criminal justice is little better than a lottery ; in which, however, the best chances are with the criminal ; and this is also very much the opinion of the European Mofussil community ;”—that “ a very small proportion of heinous offenders are ever brought to trial ;”—that “ it now appears that half of those brought to trial are sure to be acquitted ;”—and that “ peculiar and accidental circumstances, partly temporary and partly arising out of the constitution of the Civil Service, have, at this moment, made the inexperienced condition of the Magistracy more observable than it has ever been before, while it seems certain that the evil during several successive years is likely very seriously to increase ;” and, your Memorialists attach great weight to these remarkable and important declarations.”

The prayer of the Memorial was not granted, and thereupon a Petition embodying that Memorial was presented to the House of Commons by Mr. Kinnaird. In that Petition the Missionaries said :—

“ That your Petitioners did not present this Memorial from any doubt of His Honor’s personal familiarity with the social or political state of Bengal ; but your Petitioners were aware that the whole extent of the evils which press upon the people of Bengal was not generally understood, and they hoped that an enquiry conducted by able and conscientious men, would (by authoritatively eliciting and placing on record the real facts of the case) greatly assist the Government in its deliberations, enlighten public opinion, check by its mere publicity the growth of some existing evils, and in many other ways contribute to the welfare of the country.

“ That your Petitioners believed that the prayer of their Memorial was so reasonable and moderate, and the necessity for a benevolent and careful investigation into the statements of your Petitioners was so evident, that the Commission for which they applied would be readily granted.

“ That your Petitioners would remind your Honorable House that the social condition of the people of this country has rarely, if at all, been made the subject of Parliamentary enquiry ; and that nearly the whole of the evidence received by your Honorable House, concerning

the existing fiscal and Judicial arrangements of India, has been given by persons who have been officially connected with their administration, or identified with that form of government, by which the systems in use were established and have been upheld.

“That your Petitioners would further represent to your Honorable House, that from the peculiar secrecy which till recently marked the proceedings of the local Governments, and the Supreme Government of India, their records have very rarely afforded knowledge to any but the officers immediately connected with the separate departments of the State; there has been no opportunity for public discussion; and very little information of an authentic and authoritative character has been conveyed through the channel of the public press; while the formation of public opinion, either on the acts of Government, or on the events happening in the wide regions under the sway of the Government of Bengal, has been precluded or rendered impracticable by the almost entire absence of the means of inter-communication, which, your Petitioners regret to say, still characterizes, after a hundred years of occupation, the Bengal Presidency.

“That your Petitioners must further represent to your Honorable House, that from the exclusive character of the Government Service, the views of its public officers have been naturally and necessarily liable to a peculiar bias, and that the public records, if published, would rarely afford that full comprehensive survey of subjects affecting the civil and social interests of the people which the minds of men more favorably circumstanced would supply.

“That your Petitioners therefore believe that, in this country, there is special need for an impartial enquiry of a public nature, and your Petitioners submit that their Memorial exhibits sufficient and most urgent grounds, on which, with special propriety, their request for such an enquiry might have been granted at the present time.”

And they presented the following considerations which appeared to have been overlooked in the refusal of the Enquiry :—

First.—“The condition of Bengal is peculiarly distressing from the long and lamentable neglect which has been so remarkable in its history. Your Petitioners admit that, joined as the Governorship of Bengal was with the Governor Generalship of India up to the year 1854, or held for short periods with limited authority by the Member of Council, who happened to be Senior, when the Governor General was absent, it was unreasonable to expect any uniform or satisfactory and efficient course of administration. It was because this peculiarity in the position of Bengal was well known and severely felt, that the Marquis of Dalhousie (as your Petitioners believe) recommended that provision should be made for a separate Governor for Bengal; that several witnesses before the Committee of your Honorable House declared the necessity of that measure; and that Petitions were presented to your Honorable House (from your present Petitioners among others,) praying for that act of obvious justice and utility. The East India Company’s Act of 1853

provided for that long-desired arrangement, and your Petitioners thankfully acknowledge the wisdom of Parliament in the enactment. But your Petitioners represent to your Honorable House, that this wise measure cannot at once remove the effect of past neglect; and that far from being a reason why enquiry into the condition of the people should not be granted, it should rather be a reason why enquiry should be granted and prosecuted, with a view to vigorous measures under all the advantages of this new system of Government.

Secondly.—"The expediency of supplying the Legislative Council of India with that information which is needful to guide its various members who have not long been resident in Bengal. That Council has not the power, like your Honorable House, of appointing Committees of Enquiry, and taking oral evidence prior to legislation; and in the absence of this, if no Commission of Enquiry for Bengal is appointed, your Petitioners fear that its members, with one or two exceptions, will be unable to decide with confidence or satisfaction, on the measures proposed or suggested.

Thirdly.—"The importance of supplying full and detailed information for the use of your Honorable House, now that matters connected with India are attracting more attention and interest in England, and your Honorable House is called, from session to session, to entertain questions which deeply concern the welfare of millions of Her Majesty's subjects in this Presidency. The information on which the Lieut. Governor of Bengal and some other members of the Government are prepared to act, may be full and satisfactory to themselves; but your Honorable House has too deep a concern in the affairs of the country, to rest satisfied without sharing the information, which, if confined to individuals, must perish at their decease, or become unavailable on their surrendering the offices they occupy.

Fourthly.—"The desirableness of eliciting the testimony of classes of people in India, who hitherto have rarely, if ever, been allowed an opportunity of giving evidence respecting the operations of the Government, and the adaptation of the existing Regulations to the state of the people. Such classes are the independent Europeans, and the unofficial Natives.

Fifthly.—"The desirableness of explaining why measures of improvement, the necessity and justice of which appears to be admitted now by the Government of India, have been delayed so long.

Sixthly.—"The example afforded by the Government of Great Britain, in reference to other possessions of the Crown. Your Petitioners would remind your Honorable House of two Royal Commissions of Enquiry to Canada, of one to Ceylon, and of one to Borneo very recently; and your Petitioners would also call to mind the Commission over which the Earl of Devon presided in Ireland, which was issued during Sir Robert Peel's administration, and which was not considered supererogatory or needless, although many of the subjects embraced in its enquiries had previously been subjects of investigation by your Honorable House."

But this is not all. Mr. J. P. Grant introduced a measure to

amend the present Sale Law into the Legislative Council, in December 1855. As it was opposed, and as the Missionaries believed it to be an important boon to the oppressed cultivators, they thus recently addressed the Council in a petition on the subject. Others were speaking for their own interests—Zemindars and Indigo Planters—and the Government of Bengal, and such of the Revenue Officers as took the trouble to notice the matter at all, were stating the obstacles to the practical operation of the bill. But as friends of the poor, the Missionaries had to show how their circumstances demanded this relief. And they thus stated their views:—

“That your Petitioners beg leave to submit to your Honorable Council, their views on the evils which that Bill is designed to meet; and generally, on the position of the cultivating classes in this Presidency; and they respectfully but earnestly solicit the favourable consideration of your Honorable Council, to their representation of the claims of those classes of the community, who are unable effectually to plead for themselves.

“That your Petitioners recognize in the Perpetual Settlement an important boon to the whole Presidency, in its limitation of the Land Tax, and they regard that settlement as the probable foundation of great national prosperity. But in the practical operation of the system, your Petitioners observe two distinct classes of evils.

First.—“The under-tenures are insecure; the rents of the cultivating classes are capriciously varied; and the interests of those classes are virtually unprotected.

Secondly.—“The Zemindars are armed with extraordinary and excessive powers.

“That your Petitioners believe it to be notorious, that the intentions of the Laws for securing leases to the tenants; for securing them receipts on their payments of rent; for limiting within just bounds the rents reserved in leases; and for checking the custom of exacting abwabs, and other arbitrary additional charges and cesses, are commonly frustrated and defeated. On the other hand, the power of the Zemindars, (as recognized in Reg. VII. of 1799, Sec. 15, Cl. 8), to compel the personal attendance of their tenants, for the adjustment of rent and other purposes, is, practically, in many parts of the country, a substitute for the regular and ordinary processes of the Law, and is virtually the subjection of the tenants to a state of slavery. And, further, this evil is in many instances greatly aggravated, by the estates being held in cotenancy, so that several shareholders, who are often in a state of conflict, equally exercise an arbitrary and unrestrained authority.

“That while this Law thus presses severely on the tenants, your Petitioners observe, that from the increased cultivation of the soil, and the greatly increased value of its produce, the Zemindars, who were primarily regarded simply as Collectors of the Land Tax, or Farmers of the Revenue, entitled to a fair profit on the returns,

derive now a revenue greatly in excess of the revenue which they pay to Government. And thus, contemporaneously, while the Zemindar has been rising in wealth and power, the tenant has been sinking into penury and dependence, subject to illegal and exhausting exactions, harassed by contending proprietors, and oppressed by the exercise of extra-judicial powers.

"That your Petitioners submit, that this result was neither designed nor contemplated by the Perpetual Settlement. By that arrangement certain great advantages were secured. A moderate assessment was levied on the land, in substitution for uncertain and unlimited demands; and an important class in the community, who were regarded as foremost in intelligence and influence, were placed in a position of responsibility, usefulness, and honor. But these Zemindars have, since that time, not only acquired by Law the power of enforcing their demands by *ex-parte* proceedings, commencing with the arrest and imprisonment of the tenants, but have also received the sanction of the Law, as already stated, to their custom of enforcing the personal attendance of their tenants at their pleasure; and both these powers, but especially the latter, your Petitioners believe they often greatly and shamefully abuse.

"That in the practical and extended development of this system, it is manifest that the tenants suffer from a lax administration of Laws passed for their protection; that they are oppressed by the execution of other laws, which arm the Zemindars with excessive power; that they do not share with the Zemindars in the advantages derived from the development of the resources of the country; that the profits thus monopolized by the Zemindars, are already incalculably valuable: and that year after year, the condition of the tenants appears more and more pitiable and hopeless.

"That your Petitioners are compelled to add, that other evils increase the wretchedness of the condition to which a tenant is thus reduced. The Village Chowkedars are the servants of his Landlord; the Government Police are corrupt, and he cannot vie with his Landlord in purchasing their favor; the Courts of Justice are dilatory and expensive, and are often far distant from his abode, so that he has no hope of redress for the most cruel wrongs; and he is frequently implicated in affrays, respecting disputed boundaries, in which he has not the slightest personal interest. Ignorant of his rights, uneducated, subdued by oppression, accustomed to penury, and sometimes reduced to destitution, the cultivator of the soil, in many parts of this Presidency, derives little benefit from the British rule, beyond protection from Mahratta invasions.

"That your Petitioners believe that under these circumstances, the interference of your Honorable Council is urgently demanded by justice and benevolence; and they view the present Sale Bill as an important step in the right direction.

"That the objections of the Zemindars to the measure, appear to your Petitioners entirely futile. It appears to your Petitioners unquestionable, that your Honorable Council may justly protect the tenant, provided only it leave the Zemindar ample means of paying

the Government Revenue, and a fair profit on his collections. The elevation of this Zemindary class, by extraordinary protective and fostering measures, is not a policy that can be wisely or equitably pursued, to the sacrifice of the great mass of the people."

The minutes of Mr. Halliday and of Lord Canning, and of the other Members of Council, while they treated the Memorial for Enquiry with respect, denied that there was disaffection, and rested mainly on the ground, that the condition of the cultivators was already well and sufficiently known. With this there were mingled other objections, such as the length of time the Enquiry would take, the expectations it would excite, the delay of good measures it would occasion, and the course of administration and of legislative reform, which had already been commenced by the Government. Admissions of considerable importance certainly were made, but the case as represented by the Missionaries was substantially denied, and the Court of Directors have since emphatically approved of the refusal of the Enquiry, and vindicated their course of administration. Now, what is the *truth* of this case? The point at issue, it will be observed, is narrowed simply to this: *is* the condition of the people already so well known, that a Commission of Enquiry can do no good, and may do much harm? That is the question. We submit that it evidently is *not* known to Mr. Mangles, who probably speaks the sentiments of the Court of Directors; and if we may assume that the Committee of the House of Commons adopted the sentiment of so able and so well informed a witness, we must conclude that it is equally unknown to them. The case of the cultivators of Bengal, as represented by Mr. Mangles, is identical with that of the cottier of Ireland, in 1852. But how stands the fact? Ireland had unhappily suffered for centuries from political and religious differences, and civil war. In recent years, when all national jealousies and bitterness might have been appeased, both were roused and inflamed by new political agitation. There was no social peace; there was a restraint on the industry of the people; there was a system of landed tenures which originated in the follies of the proprietors of the soil, who were, commonly, heavily encumbered, and in the excessive competition for land among a redundant population, who took it from exacting middlemen. But there was an admirable Police force; there was a perfectly just and vigorous administration of Civil and Criminal justice; a system of national education was beginning to produce its effects on the people; new laws had commenced to operate for the sale of encumbered estates; and a very considerable proportion of the population had perished in a year of famine; another large portion was emigrating to the United States; and it was notorious that a new era of peaceful labour, and of intelligent agricultural

enterprise, was dawning on the country. Very much had in fact already occurred, to ameliorate the social condition of the Irish people.

In Bengal the Police force was an acknowledged atrocity. The administration of Civil justice was slow, and expensive, and virtually was prohibited to the poor. Criminal justice was a lottery. The testimony of the Missionaries was, we confidently assert, true to the letter, as to the insecurity of life and property, the contentions about disputed boundaries, and the impediments to investments in land. Mr. Mangles saw only the mat and bamboohut, and plantain groves, and all those resources which a most luxuriant land enables almost the poorest beggar to enjoy; and he might as well have noticed at the same time the diseases incidental to the climate, and the liability of large parts of the country to inundations, the ravages of wild animals to the crops, and the want of roads to take the ryot's produce to market. The Missionaries saw the cultivator behind these plantain groves reduced to practical slavery; under grievously offensive rent laws; almost entirely uneducated; a prey to petty tyrants; with no Courts of justice near him; liable to be seized and imprisoned, and to have his crops seized, on false ex-parte statements, by his landlord, without the slightest hope of redress; liable to extortionate and arbitrary exactions of increased rent; with scarcely clothes to cover him in the cold season; unable to get leases for land which his ancestor held, it might be, long before his landlord obtained that peculiar interest in the soil, which Lord Cornwallis gave him in 1793; and lastly, liable to be expelled and ousted, not for his own default, but after his own rent had been paid, for the default of his landlord in paying his rent to government.

We need say no more. Both these pictures cannot be correct representations. And yet it is a matter affecting millions of people. It is a matter too important to be settled by the concurrence of Mr. Mangles, who has always viewed things as a Member of Government, and Sir Thomas Redington, who knew nothing, but what he had heard from such persons. But more than this; it is not a matter to be settled by an Enquiry by a Committee of the House of Commons, if that Enquiry be similar to the Enquiry of 1852-53. We are willing to give credit to the witnesses who spoke there for sincerity, and for a desire to tell all they knew. But it is not possible that men who have been trained up in the lap of the East India Company, who have thriven into wealth through that powerful corporation, who owe to it all they possess of wealth and influence, and who look to it, and to a continuance of its present system, for the advancement of their families and friends, to

speak dispassionately, or to weigh the interests of the people with those of that Company. It is not possible; and consequently, it is so plain that no one who has studied the evidence taken can doubt it, that, in fact, the condition of the people was almost entirely ignored, or was erroneously represented. The witnesses, with few exceptions, were men identified with the system of Government, which was then under trial, and gave precisely the evidence that might have been expected. We are speaking of the case of Bengal. Renew that Enquiry now, conduct it in the same way, and the result will be the same. There is but one mode of reaching the truth, and that is by a Royal Commission to Bengal, to enquire into the condition of the people. That measure is demanded by justice and benevolence, and we cannot believe that it will be refused much longer. The objections to it, we believe, are merely specious and unsubstantial; exactly such as may be suggested, and are suggested, to every new and important measure, by timorous, by interested, by idle, or by narrow-minded men—and honestly by some few others, who with the most anxious desire to do that which is right, act under a mis-conception of the circumstances. Such men we *know* have opposed the Commission reluctantly;—for the opposition of others we were prepared.

It is not, however, simply the condition of the people which requires investigation in Bengal. It was right and becoming in the Missionaries, when they applied for a Commission of Enquiry, to confine themselves to the condition of the people, and those topics which bore directly upon it. But there is a larger scope for enquiry. We believe that the development of the resources of this country is a matter of imperial concern, and that the progress of the present line of Railway, the addition of others, the extension of inland steam navigation, the increase of roads, and the port at the Mutlah, are equally matters requiring investigation. The question too, as to the present exclusive system of Government, under which civilians are shifted about from fiscal to judicial offices, as if equally qualified for both, or are transferred to other offices essentially different from either; the question as to the causes of past neglect; the question as to salaries, which, under the existing system, is referred to the investigation of a single member of a privileged class, whose allowances form the chief subject of consideration, and always have been zealously guarded—these matters, and we may add the propriety and expediency of continuing to maintain the Madrissa as a college for disaffected Mahommedans, and in a wider range, all the measures which tend to stimulate commerce, to excite confidence in the Government, to elevate the people, to attract European settlers and capital to the country, should be embraced in one general

Enquiry ; and for such an Enquiry, it is clear that the most able men the country's service can supply, should be willingly provided, by the united counsels of the Imperial and the Indian Governments. We do not believe that it would be difficult to frame a Commission. There are officers of Government without official prejudices ; there are men at home, who have not been in India, but who have enlarged minds, and have gained extensive knowledge of other lands ; we might have new views from the ablest men of the North West, men like Mr. Tucker of Benares, or Mr. Donald McLeod ; a Commission of men from home, like Mr. Mackay who came out to investigate the cotton districts for the Manchester Chamber of Commerce ; men like Sir John McNeil who has extensive eastern experience, and whose sagacity and firmness were eminently displayed in the Crimean Commission ; and men like Sir Charles Trevelyan who have been in India, and who have since gained additional experience of official life in important stations. It seems, indeed, an easy thing to nominate a Commission capable of doing justice to the subject, and worthy of the confidence of the country.

But we feel that it would be unjust to confine the Enquiry to Bengal.—Bengal has special claims, and special need ; the case of Madras, we have reason to fear, is not more satisfactory ; but we earnestly desire to see the case of all India taken up in a bold and noble spirit, and a Commission worthy of England sent to every Presidency. Can it be said of any Presidency, that all is already known ? In the case of Torture in Madras, the Court of Directors, and other high authorities, declared that they had never heard of it, although it was notorious at Madras, and was described in detail in the evidence given before the House of Commons, before the renewal of the Charter in 1833, and it then appeared, that a formal complaint of it had been presented to the local Government ! We require such an investigation, that *all* may be known, and known with certainty, both here and at home, and that nothing which is known may henceforth be authoritatively denied. Then as to Revenue. In 1786, the gross revenue of India was £4,210,000. We apprehend that in the past year, it was nearly thirty millions. Would this be a heavy revenue for such a country, and for such a population, if the national resources were fully developed ? If we take now ten millions worth of British manufactures, may we not hope in twenty years to take fifty millions, and to export a hundred millions of produce from our shores ? Certainly, that is no doubtful prospect. Why, then, should there be any hesitation in public works, which will tend to this development ? Why are we, in India, with insufficient capital, to keep fifty millions locked up in the public loans ? Why not empower the East India Company, with the English

Government's guarantee, to raise its loans at home? Why not amalgamate the whole imperial liabilities, by adding the Indian debt to the British debt, at three per cent., if the whole of our Indian loans can be transferred to home by raising the amount there, as easily as we added thirty millions to the British funded and unfunded debt in the Russian war? There will be abundant scope and margin in the surplus of our Exports and Imports, to pay all the interest at home, to pay the interest on all the guaranteed millions invested in our Railways,—abundant, even if England spend on India, as much as she has lavished on her own Railroads with such far inferior prospects of returns. These are things to be enquired into, considered, and decided, not in the light of private interest, not in conjunction with a pre-conceived determination to uphold the double government, the civil service, and the old system of routine, monopoly, and exclusiveness, but on such full data, as a Commission of Enquiry would afford, and with a whole-hearted, resolute, and generous desire to fulfil the high destiny of Great Britain, and to lay broad, and wide, and deep, the foundation of India's prosperity. We need this, not merely to liberate the people from the sufferings of centuries; not merely to extend the boundaries of our general commerce; but also to assist in overturning the ancient superstitions, which in the minds of this people, are inviolably bound up with the continuance of existing social evils, of popular ignorance, and of the separation from other races of men.

But men's views of this subject will naturally be influenced altogether by their views of the general policy, which it is the interest, and duty of Great Britain to pursue in India. If we think that India is always to be regarded as a conquest, to be treated as such, and held by the stern law of force, then we must go the whole length with Lord Ellenborough, and object to every measure calculated to enlighten the people. Our dominion must be a military despotism, tempered, it may be, by our national generosity, but still a military despotism, to the security of which every thing else must be subordinated; and as experience has proved, a military despotism resting on a large European army. With our great resources, it is quite possible that this policy might succeed for many years. The natives could not so effectually combine as to endanger our position, if our whole strength were directed simply to the consolidation of our power; but the process of self-preservation must then be the process of India's debasement, and our success would be purchased by our shame. But we put aside this fancy altogether. It is certain, that though temporary seasons of panic may give countenance to this theory, other views habitually

animate both the legislature and the people of England, and, that all recognize the duty of seeking the good of India by every ameliorating measure, which is calculated to develop her resources, stimulate her trade, enlighten her people, and prepare, as the result, for free and popular institutions. The duty is acknowledged of spreading education, and of admitting the natives of the country gradually, and so far as is consistent with British supremacy, to all the offices of Government, for which they become qualified. This then necessarily involves a social revolution—not a violent displacement of British authority, not a sudden disturbance of all existing distinctions, but a transition period, with an adaptation of new institutions to progressively advancing stages of public sentiment, till, in the end, the distant sway of England may be recognized here rather than felt, by a Colonial Government—not free from her influence, not hostile to her interests, but the fruit of her wise, beneficent, and magnanimous preparation of India's people for self-government. There will of course be dangers and trials in the interval. No policy can exempt us from them. We cannot look around us even now, without observing that every educated man chafes under the sense of social disabilities, and cherishes and spreads around him disaffection. As such men increase and multiply, as they gain from the progress of civilization, and European habits, more manliness, and courage, they will exercise a wider influence; and as popular education spreads, there will be also among the mass of the people a more distinct perception of their position; they will be more open to the influence of a seditious native press; and the sense of their power, when united, may lead to lawless combinations, especially if a few men of strong will, and decisive character, arise to lead the way. And then too, it should not be forgotten, that there is another element in our social state, which *must* work with constantly increasing power. There must be felt, more and more, the disruption produced by the spread of general Christian truth, and by the necessary effects of actual earnest Christianity in individuals;—and then, assuredly, the ancient superstitions, and the old vile priesthood which is the woe of India, will not die without a struggle. We shall hear of fears for Hinduism and Mahomedanism from those who call themselves Christians, if we hear none from the people themselves; the alarm will spread, and all the usual arts will be employed to entrap the Government into insane attempts to check the work of Christian Missions, and to discourage the progress of Christianity. But this, happily, is a matter far above the power of Governments. The conflict with Christianity tested the skill of Roman Rulers, and eventually, in the wild invasions from the

barbarians of the North, Christianity conquered both, preserved the relics of ancient art, literature, and law, turned the rude conquerors into patrons of the faith, and placed on the throne of the Cæsars, a professing head of the Christian Church. If a new struggle arise, there will be a nobler and purer triumph. The universal extension of the Gospel of Christ, as secured by unfailing promises, will be accomplished, and all enemies and obstacles will be swept away. This is the inevitable destiny of India and of the world. Here, then, is our prospect. We must reconcile and adapt ourselves to this. We must rule India, not so as to crush her energies, or check the advance of truth, but so as to fit her to rule herself, in the spirit of wise Christian benevolence, and so as to make our influence depend on the identification of our interests and hers, on the reciprocation of advantages, the responsive action of beneficence and gratitude, and the common tendency of England and India to the same ends, their union in the same enterprises, and their communion in Christian brotherhood. This must be our general policy, whatever temporary measures of precaution may be required at particular seasons of disaffection. If this be our policy, then we need this first step of enlarged Enquiry. It is objected, however, that it will delay measures which are evidently necessary now, by postponing legislation, till new enquiry shall have proved their necessity. It is amusing indeed, to hear this objection from those who have so much difficulty in explaining, why these measures have already been delayed so long ! Certainly their necessity is not a new discovery ;—for instance, the reform of the administration of justice, the reform of the police, or the reform of oppressive rent laws. The generation which first urged these reforms has well nigh passed away, and has seen nothing done by those who now are seized with such sudden alarm, lest a Commission of Enquiry should check their impatience to exhibit their statesman-like improvements ! Perhaps their fears are needless, and all parties who claim enquiry will consent to take their reforms *de bene esse* at once, contemporaneously with enquiry ; and consent, that the enquiry shall proceed with the view rather to discover the necessity for other measures, than to confirm the conviction already felt so long, that these reforms are urgently required. It is not much to promise, that neither we nor any others of those who advocate enquiry, will complain if the Report be, that some of the recommendations have been forestalled ; though we may enquire, why, for so many years, recommendations which will so soon occur to the Commissioners, so tardily occurred to the Court of Directors. And as the enquiry we claim need not delay good measures, (but possibly may stimulate and promote them,)—so it need not occupy any considerable

length of time. Here, again, our opponents have no cause for apprehension. If we are not much mistaken, able, practical men, with the records of Government thrown open to them, with access to every kind of personal information, might be expected to effect as much in India in a year, as a Committee of the House of Commons with only partial information, far away from the sphere of enquiry, could do in four months! Such at least is our expectation. It may seem strange, but we fail to see that such enquiries as heretofore have satisfied the Court of Directors, and the public,—enquiries for three or four months by Committees of the Houses of Parliament—have had in them the elements of more energy and complete action than a Commission would have in any presidency in India. Indeed, there appears to us something almost ludicrous in the theory, that such a commission as we have indicated, sent to each Presidency, necessarily must occupy in the labour so much more time than has been usual for such a Committee sitting without a tithe of the advantages; and the suspicion arises almost irresistibly, that the theory is not only unsound, but delusive. We certainly can imagine Commissioners who would protract their proceedings—and possibly such commissioners might be found among those gentlemen who now so earnestly deprecate delay, and who have heretofore so remarkably exhibited their own tendency to that error; but a commission to enquire into the whole case of Bengal, if it were formed of men in India, like Sir John Lawrence, Colonel Cotton, Sir H. Lawrence, Mr. Tucker, Mr. McLeod, or Mr. J. P. Grant, and men at home, like Sir C. E. Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote, would give an account of themselves, we suspect, in about a twelve-month; and in the other Presidencies, the labour would probably be less, and the result more speedy.

We fail then, to see the practical evils of these Commissions. But we do see their necessity very clearly, if the Government of India henceforth is to be that for which we are hoping. We look for, and desire a Government, not by delegation any longer, but by Public Opinion in England controlling the simple system of a Secretary of State for India. We deny positively that this system has failed when applied to the British Colonies. On the contrary, we affirm that its results have been highly honorable and advantageous to the British nation. The British Colonies have in them the foundations of future nations, and are illustrations in our national history of our general equity and justice. It is idle to apply to them one general rule, and to try them all by that. The case of nearly each one has been distinct, and it has been dealt with accordingly. In those which were gradually and slowly peopled by British immigrants, the mother-country, by constant succour, encouraged enterprise;

and as population increased, and the means of self-government increased, extended political privileges. In others, where we found on conquest, as in Lower Canada, a large foreign population already settled on the faith of definite expectations, and in the enjoyment of special laws, we have secured to them all they before possessed, and have adopted the colony in the largest spirit of benevolence, into the British family. So with Colonies captured from the Dutch—the Cape Colony and Ceylon. In those Colonies, where the population was obtained principally from the barbarous slave trade, our legislature first set the example of protection to the oppressed, and first gave freedom to the enslaved. Our Colonial history is the early history of British Commerce and enterprise; our Colonies were the trophies, and the nurseries of our navy, and for many years, the great foreign supporters of our domestic manufactures; they have been the source of wealth and luxury to multitudes, and the homes of multitudes more; and they are destined to extend the Anglo-Saxon race, language, religion, and freedom, with reproductive power, throughout the world. Errors there have been in our policy,—errors, in some cases, as in the United States, which have been overruled to produce unbounded good; though in the early history of the United States, there are evidences of remarkable wisdom in our English statesmen. But taken as a whole, we have reason to be thankful for the past, and to look with hope and growing confidence to the future. It is then to this Government by the British Ministry, controlled by the British Legislative, and now, more than ever, governed by Public Opinion, that we would consign the Government of India; and it is because we espouse this kind of Government, that we desire to see Commissions of Enquiry opened, to enlighten that Public Opinion. It is, we believe, high time for measures of the kind. Year after year, the British Public, if not mystified about Indian affairs, has been left to grope on in the dark; and thus, all sense of responsibility has failed, and there has been a placid, stupified contentment with the total inability to judge on the subject. England has boasted of her voyages of discovery; she has sent expedition after expedition to explore a North-West passage; she has tried and is trying now again to gain entrance up the Niger and Tshad to the heart of Africa, but her knowledge of India is confined almost entirely to ex-parte statements of those who are identified with the delegated authority which it is their interest to perpetuate. The people of India have never been examined; the type of “Old Indian” has been the settled class of informants in Indian affairs; and so the strain of adulation has been prolonged, whenever the East India Company has been mentioned.

We cannot enter at length into the special topics of Enquiry, but we must confine ourselves to those which are connected with the commerce and resources of India. And first of all for Public Works. It is to Mr. Bright (whom Manchester, in imitation of Bristol in the case of Mr. Burke, has lately rejected) that we owe the impulse given to Public Works in India. The writings, and the personal influence of Colonel Arthur Cotton, influenced him, and enabled him to advocate the cause of India with vigour and effect; but he laboured under great difficulties. The Committee of Enquiry supplied him with inadequate information, and there was no one in the House of Commons able and willing to support him with the weight of personal knowledge. On the contrary, he only heard there of the immense works already accomplished. But he had the alleged fact, that in the Indian Treasury, there were cash balances to the extent of fourteen millions sterling (an allegation in which we, like others, then believed;) he had the means of judging that this was a needless amount, and with that bold and rapid glance by which he usually mastered the most difficult questions, he saw that the limited extent of English Imports into India, and the difficulty of supplying England with Indian cotton, both arose from one cause—the almost total neglect by the British Government in India of the means of intercommunication. The result of his efforts was a despatch from Sir Charles Wood, authorizing the expenditure of seven millions on Public Works. Lord Dalhousie knew well that, in that form, the order could not be obeyed. The process of spending money on Public Works must needs be slow and gradual, and so he resolved to continue his operation of paying off the five per cent. loans (and thus reducing the interest to four per cent., and relieving the public expenditure to the extent of £250,000 a year)—and then to have a distinct Public Works Loan opened at four per cent., for all that might be subsequently required. He calculated on having to pay off much of the five per cents. to those who objected to the reduction of the interest to four per cent.; he believed that the balances were less than fourteen millions; and that with so large a number of treasuries and in so vast an empire, nothing less than nine millions should be retained. A Public Works Loan was therefore inevitable. But unfortunately, his expectations of success in his operation were disappointed by the rise in the interest of money consequent on the war, and also we apprehend by the real balances falling far short, not only of their reputation, but also of the expectations of the Governor General himself. Public Works were largely undertaken; the Court of Directors continued drawing far beyond their actual wants; and the treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy. The Public Works Loan had to be

prematurely opened, and it was necessary to fix the interest at five per cent. This immediately brought down the whole four per cent. stock, which had lately been received at par, to the amount of many millions, to about eighty; and the Government sustained in its credit the most severe shock it ever encountered. In looking back now, it is easy to see that the whole arrangement was a failure, but it was a failure occasioned solely by the war. But for the war and the rise of interest at home, India would not have suffered by the withdrawal of so much English capital after the conversion of the five per cent., or it would very speedily have been replaced, by contributions to the intended four per cent. Loan for Public Works. But it is vain to look back; save to notice for future amendment, the system of extravagant, needless, drafts from the East India Company, (which undoubtedly were the immediate cause in 1855, of the difficulty in the treasury in Calcutta;) and that system of accounts, which deluded the highest authorities in England, into the belief that there were available for the public service fourteen millions of cash balances. Why the Court of Directors should always keep in hand three millions and a half or four millions of money, and draw for their supplies in their accustomed capricious uncertain manner, we are quite unable to explain; and equally does it seem inexplicable, that a system of accounts, which produce such a result as a delusive balance, should be preserved a single year longer.

As the case stands now, Government is pledged to many Public Works, with a gross income inadequate to the gross expenditure, and after having experienced much difficulty in obtaining money in the new public loan at five per cent. This latter difficulty, however, was occasioned by the very ill-judged opening of a four and half per cent loan last year, as a tentative measure. The prospect of the need of money was manifest; it was certain that the four and half per cent. loan might be a failure; it was equally certain that a five per cent. loan opened at that period, just after the restoration of the peace, and guaranteed to remain unredeemed for fifteen or twenty years, would be rapidly filled up; and that loan should therefore have been opened for a sum large enough to cover every prospective want. The course to be taken, now, in existing circumstances, when such tardy confidence has been placed in the five per cent. loan, and when the expenditure in the current year will be greatly above the income, and with the prospect of extraordinary expenses, and of a further deficiency next year, we will not now fully consider. We have already intimated our opinion, that permanent relief might be had, and should be had, from home;—but that would be in the form of England guaranteeing or adopting the whole Indian debt,

buying up the four per cents., and arranging for all present and future loans being hereafter raised in London at English interest. But the first question is, whether there is not a simple method of relief for the present time—namely, the total cessation of the East India Company's drafts for a twelve month, and their being compelled for the future, to terminate the year with no greater balance than half a million, and to draw for each year's supplies in twenty-four equal parts—one part regularly by each fortnight's mail. Having so large a balance in hand, they need not draw at all for some time, and they should not be permitted to do so. This would afford sufficient needful relief for the present year, and would be an immense advantage in the year to come.

One thing at least will be undisputed—that our Public Works cannot be allowed to stop. The increase of production occasioned by the establishment of peace (as in the Punjab or Oude) is in many places a positive evil to the people. They have large supplies of additional produce, and no vent or outlet for it. The prices fall; meanwhile the Government rent remains the same, and the prices of the cloths, and other goods, which the people have to import, also remain the same; and they suffer from their plethora of production. At the same time other parts of the country, or other and distant lands, remain in want of these very surplus products. Our rivers touch only some parts of the country, and some of them are not navigable. The railroads will become of immense value, but their commencement, as we have stated, was not earlier than 1850; their progress has been, and will be, slow, and they also affect only parts of this vast country. We evidently require practicable roads in abundance, converging on the Railway lines and the rivers; and the improvement of our river navigation; and all this on an extensive and liberal scale. We have already adverted to the navigation of the Gogra. We believe that there are few rivers like it in India; and that there should be a good road made at once from Lucknow to Fyzabad, and a Steam Company provided to run up the Gogra from Bhagulpore, or some port where the Calcutta Railway line could meet the traffic. But there are other rivers of equal importance. It is conceded that the difficulties of navigating the Nerbudda appear to be impracticable; but the navigation of the Godavery is feasible, and it seems to us to stand out, at the present time, as the most needful and the most hopeful enterprise in India. The case respecting it was very ably stated in a series of letters in the *Friend of India* of 1856—commencing on the 31st July. They were signed *H.*, and were presumed to be written by the

engineer officer, who has charge of the Godavery Anicut. He said : ' Look at the Map. Ninety miles west of Nagpore is Umruttee, and forty-five miles S. S. W. of the same city, Hingunghat, both towns important centres of Cotton districts. The river which flows between them, is the Wurdah, a tributary of the Godavery, and a steamer on it near Hingunghat, would be distant from the Port of Coriuga (by the river) 445 miles. Now supposing the steamer to proceed down the river from Hingunghat in the month of July, when the river is in flood, she would find the first 100 miles of it to be perfectly clear, open, and easy navigation ; then for thirty miles, a swifter and more disturbed current, with points of rock appearing here and there, indicating an extensive mass of rock beneath. The next eighty miles would be found perfectly clear sailing, and the current slight ; then would succeed, near the confluence of the Indravatty, ten miles similar to the rocky reach above mentioned ; after this seventy miles of unbroken navigation, without obstruction of any kind ; then fifteen miles of rather rocky bed, but beyond this, for a distance of 112 miles to Dowlaisaram, an easy and unimpeded navigation : at Dowlaisaram, I should ask you to leave the steamer while she passed through the lock into the Cocanada Canal, and to take a look at the first of the five weirs which here span the Godavery, forming together the Grand Anicut, four miles in length, from end to end, with a clear waterway of two miles and a half, and I think, if time allowed of your inspecting this magnificent work, with the three great ducts which lead off the water from it for the irrigation of the Delta, delivering altogether a volume of 1,200,000 cubic yards per hour, or one-third greater than the Ganges Canal, you would admit that after all that has been said of the " Benighted," the greatest triumphs of engineering science India can boast, are to be met with, not in the North West, but in Rajahmundry. A fine canal, thirty-three miles long, leads direct from the Anicut to Cocanada, the principal town of this part of Coringa. Thus then you will observe, in the whole distance of 445 miles, there are but sixty miles, where the navigation is impeded by rock in the bed. During the three months from July to September, which include the flood season, these rocks are frequently so completely submerged, as to form no impediment whatever, and a powerful steamer might make several trips between Hingunghat and the Coast, sometimes indeed, ascending the river as high as Natchingram, which is only thirty miles distant from Umruttee." He then proceeds to a thorough investigation of the subject in reference to the whole course of the river, and some of the tributaries, and establishes the feasibility of navigat-

ing 1,800 miles, and vindicates Colonel Cotton's general views respecting this and its connected topics, in his book on Public Works in India. The result is a strong impression, that at least *this* subject should be taken up by an immediate and earnest enquiry; and that contemporaneously with the Deccan Railway, the works for opening the Godavery should be vigorously prosecuted. For, with respect to Cotton, there appears to be little doubt, first, that the American and European demand is already beyond the American supply, and that additional supplies from India are urgently required; secondly, that as good Cotton as American Cotton, can be grown in India; thirdly, that with reasonable care it can be obtained in a fit state, and not in its ordinary state, —mixed with dirt; and lastly, that such Cotton can be produced in India, at one penny to two pence a pound. If then, there be rivers, like the Wurdah and Indraverda flowing into the Godavery, and capable of carrying the produce of a vast extent of Cotton country to such excellent ports as Coringa, and Coconada, no ordinary obstacles should be allowed to delay the commencement of the works necessary to open the navigation; and the result would amply repay almost any amount of outlay in the undertaking. But the culture of Cotton in Gujerat, as well as in the Deccan, render Public Works needful, and we believe, that nothing which appears on the subject in Mackay's Western India, is at all an exaggerated statement of past neglect. On the general subject of the cultivation and export of Cotton in India, we cannot here enlarge. It appears probable that outlets are alone wanted, and that they have become so necessary, and so important, that the British Parliament should insist on immediate enquiries and prompt measures.

We have given in former pages some returns which indicate the progress of the Export of Cotton in conjunction with other articles; but the importance of this product, not to Great Britain only, but to China also, requires that we should add some further details, in order to mark the rate of previous progress. Dr. Forbes Royle supplies the following table, for which he acknowledges his obligation to the late Mr. G. R. Porter.

Table of the Aggregate Imports of Cotton into Great Britain, of the Quantities received from the United States, and India respectively, with the prices of the two kinds.

Years.	Aggregate Imports into Great Britain.	Imports from the United States.	Imports from India.	Prices of other than Indian Cotton at Liverpool.		Of Surat Cotton at Liverpool.	
	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	pence.	pence	pence.	pence
1800	56,010,732	16,000,000	6,629,822	16	to 36	10	to 18
1801	56,004,303	19,000,000	4,098,256	17	to 38	14	to 18
1802	60,345,600	23,500,000	2,679,483	12	to 38	10	to 18
1803	53,812,284	27,750,000	3,182,960	8	to 15	9	to 14
1804	61,867,329	25,750,000	1,166,355	10	to 18	8	to 15
1805	59,682,406	32,500,000	694,050	14	to 19	12	to 17
1806	58,176,283	24,250,000	2,725,450	15	to 21½	12	to 17
1807	74,925,306	53,250,000	3,993,150	15½	to 19	10	to 15
1808	43,605,982	8,000,000	4,729,200	15½	to 36	14	to 25½
1809	92,812,282	13,500,000	12,517,400	14	to 34	11	to 26
1810	132,488,935	36,000,000	27,783,700	14½	to 22½	12½	to 19
1811	91,576,535	46,750,000	5,126,100	12½	to 16	10½	to 13
1812	63,025,936	26,000,000	915,950	13	to 23½	12	to 16
1813	50,966,000	War between England & U.S.	497,350	21	to 30	15½	to 20
1814	60,060,239		4,725,000	23	to 37	18	to 25
1815	99,306,343	45,666,000	8,505,000	18	to 25½	14½	to 21
1816	93,920,055	57,750,000	10,850,000	15	to 21	14	to 18½
1817	124,912,968	51,000,000	40,294,250	16½	to 23½	14½	to 20
1818	177,282,158	58,333,000	86,555,000	16½	to 22	7	to 20½
1819	149,739,820	57,750,000	62,405,000	10	to 19¾	5	to 14½
1820	151,672,655	89,999,174	20,294,400	8	to 13¾	6¾	to 12
1821	132,536,620	93,470,745	10,626,000	7	to 11½	6½	to 9½
1822	142,837,628	101,031,766	6,742,040	5	to 11	5½	to 8½
1823	191,402,503	142,532,112	13,487,250	6	to 10¾	5½	to 8½
1824	149,380,122	92,187,662	17,796,100	7	to 10½	5½	to 8
1825	228,005,291	139,908,699	21,175,700	6	to 19½	5½	to 16
1826	177,607,401	130,858,203	22,641,300	5½	to 8¾	4½	to 7
1827	272,448,909	216,924,812	25,742,150	4	to 7¾	3¾	to 6½
1828	227,760,642	151,752,289	29,670,200	5	to 7¾	3½	to 5½
1829	222,767,411	157,137,396	28,147,700	4	to 7	2½	to 5½
1830	263,961,452	210,885,358	12,324,200	5	to 7½	3	to 6
1831	288,674,853	219,333,628	26,828,900	4¾	to 7½	3½	to 5¾
1832	286,832,525	219,756,753	38,249,750	5	to 8	3½	to 5½
1833	303,656,837	237,506,758	32,755,164	6½	to 12½	4½	to 8¾
1834	326,875,425	269,203,075	32,920,865	8½	to 10½	5½	to 7¾
1835	363,702,963	284,455,812	41,474,909	9	to 12½	6½	to 8¾
1836	406,959,057	289,615,692	75,746,926	7	to 11	5½	to 8½
1837	407,286,783	320,351,716	51,577,141	7	to 8¾	4½	to 6
1838	507,850,577	431,437,888	40,229,495	6½	to 9	5½	to 6½
1839	389,396,559	311,597,798	47,170,640	5¾	to 7¾	4½	to 6½
1840	592,488,010	437,856,504	77,010,917	5½	to 7	4	to 5
1841	487,992,355	358,214,964	97,368,312	4½	to 6¾	3	to 5
1842	531,750,128	405,325,600	96,555,186	4	to 6	3½	to 4½
1843	674,196,992	558,735,600	68,820,570	4	to 6	3	to 4½
1844	616,111,304	517,218,622	88,639,608	3½	to 4½	3	to 4½
1845	721,979,953	626,650,412	58,437,426	2½	to 4½	2½	to 3½
1846	442,759,336	382,526,000	33,711,420	4½	to 7	3½	to 5
1847	474,707,615	364,599,291	83,934,614	6	to 4½	5	to 2¾
1848	713,020,161	600,247,488	84,104,961	3½	to 5½	2½	to 3¾
1849	775,469,008	5½	to 8.	3½	to 5

We cannot continue the paper in the same form, but we find in the Appendix to the Lords' Report, which we have already quoted, the following statement from the Court of Directors of the aggregate Exports of Cotton from India from 1834 to 1849-50.

Statement exhibiting the Quantities of Cotton exported from India to Great Britain and other Places.

YEARS.	BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
	England.	Other Parts.	England.	Other Parts.	England.	Other Parts.
	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.
1834-35	3,051,190	25,835,616	3,039,500	1,712,500	32,177,712	32,408,532
1835-36	11,681,706	45,997,884	7,761,500	11,974,500	45,795,596	32,398,996
1836-37	1,586,408	34,546,456	8,316,000	18,873,500	68,163,901	47,091,927
1837-38	380,074	16,040,490	1,256,500	3,908,000	38,100,472	59,062,944
1838-39	293,350	17,464,702	2,400,500	8,569,000	31,800,887	69,547,360
1839-40	2,100,346	12,727,978	12,991,500	6,978,500	59,001,134	34,209,152
1840-41	106,434	14,975,440	3,888,500	8,650,500	81,581,688	49,981,749
1841-42	365,620	8,879,191	13,384,000	10,610,500	104,795,091	56,221,477
1842-43	158,732	14,024,418	2,629,000	21,319,500	69,839,014	81,939,416
1843-44	143,142	16,404,798	1,576,500	12,933,500	91,781,824	79,662,004
1844-45	109,636	16,469,184	7,166,000	18,908,500	50,854,590	70,969,407
1845-46	12,154	7,691,580	3,123,000	7,160,000	40,042,243	68,248,573
1846-47	0	9,510,814	3,466,500	9,270,000	87,607,744	59,225,773
1847-48	1,624,433	11,147,072	3,147,746	6,315,332	89,429,561	48,653,151
1848-49	30,513	2,907,098	3,033,728	8,257,037	64,139,278	90,263,812
1849-50	27,306	1,817,971	5,026,023	8,038,937	105,637,028	45,117,935

The Reports of External Commerce for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, enable us to continue this statement, and we give the value in sterling money at two shillings to the rupee. This latter statement will be a sufficient indication of the capabilities of India; for the progress it manifests has been made under accumulated disadvantages. With adequate means of communication with the sea, the impulse given to the production would be extraordinary. Whether Bombay would then be (as now) the chief port for Cotton Export, or whether Madras, Coringa, Rangoon, and Calcutta, might not compete with her in importance, would depend on circumstances which we cannot now foresee; but Bombay, in other respects, appears to have a promising future before her, not only as the great port for the arrival and departure of passengers, but also, as the most convenient port for the traffic of all Western India, and of a large part of Central and Western Asia:—

EXPORTS OF COTTON FROM INDIA

To United Kingdom.

1850-51.	lbs.	Value. £	Total Exported. lbs.	Total Value. £
Bengal	958,080	12,009	22,498,400	281,262
Madras	9,037,889	116,342	45,183,604	582,279
Bombay	131,423,883	1,931,365	184,291,863	2,798,032
1851-52.				
Bengal	624,880	7,811	39,671,200	495,875
Madras	4,632,380	61,540	35,359,252	403,521
Bombay	75,829,306	1,101,927	195,710,024	2,906,835
1852-53.				
Bengal	6,672,040	83,328	32,568,160	407,101
Madras	16,875,197	191,871	76,067,998	866,507
Bombay	157,932,069	2,249,986	197,881,840	2,839,390
1853-54.				
Bengal	1,812,160	22,651	15,964,640	199,363
Madras	8,703,984	113,782	31,325,840	378,537
Bombay	127,396,389	1,808,625	172,036,925	2,477,610
1854-55.				
Bengal			7,307,760	91,353
Madras	8,006,035	104,490	26,849,395	311,942
Bombay	111,443,366	1,578,923	153,947,800	2,174,390
1855-56.				
Bengal	12,028,480	150,356	13,912,640	173,353
Madras	4,792,388	58,899	21,013,464	252,134
Bombay	165,380,930	2,320,454	217,487,413	3,074,089

Of the large quantity exported to other countries than Great Britain, we may remark that the average Export to China from Bombay alone in the last five years was 54,450,579 lbs., of the annual average value of £812,380. Indeed, Cotton to Great Britain, and Cotton and Opium to China, constitute a very large portion of the aggregate Exports of Bombay. The Opium exported in 1854-55 was valued at £2,540,000, and in 1855-56 at £2,560,000.

With regard to Railways in India, we believe that no estimate which has been yet published, has reached the probable result of all those lines which pass through the productive portions of the country, and terminate at important ports, or are connected by other lines, or by river, with such ports. The great trunk lines connecting first Calcutta and Allahabad—then Allahabad and Delhi,—then Delhi and Peshawur,—then Bombay, Agra and Delhi,—and then Bombay and Madras,—then Bombay, Jubbulpore and Mirzapore, penetrating Central India, and linking all the chief cities; will be of great importance for military and political, as well as commercial purposes. But the Punjab appears to require most urgently, the recently proposed line from Lahore to Kurrachee. The line from the bank of Ganges to the foot of the Darjeeling hills; the line from Calcutta to Bogwangolah; and from Calcutta to Dacca; and from Cawnpore to Lucknow and Bareilly; appear to us likely to be almost equally valuable, and probably as remunerative. It appears indeed exceedingly doubtful, if the Court of Directors, in guaranteeing the dividend of five per cent., would in any of these cases suffer loss from the date of opening, and in several cases, particularly in respect of the lines terminating at Calcutta, we look for enormous returns.

The subject of Irrigation has been recently dealt with in Colonel Baird Smith's Report on the Caverry, Kistnah and Godavery, (published in 1856 by Smith, Elder and Co.) He says in conclusion: "it has been shewn that the projects either actually executed, or in progress of execution, affect tracts of country containing in the aggregate a total area of fully 20,000 square miles, or twelve and a quarter millions of acres, whereof one-half may be considered as either cultivated or culturable. This aggregate area is inhabited, at present, by a population numbering rather more than four millions of souls, whose material condition ranges from that of the utmost comfort in Tanjore, to that of the utmost depression in Guntoor; but among whom one standard, and that the highest, will ultimately prevail. Of the six millions of acres adapted to irrigation, not less than two millions will have a full supply provided for them, at a cost which in its utmost extent cannot exceed half a crore of rupees, or half a million sterling, in the aggregate; and the annual revenue obtained by the State, on which this powerful stimulus will operate, reaches at this moment to one and a quarter millions of pounds, and may be expected to advance progressively to rather more than two millions per annum. The million and three-quarters of people, forming the population of Tanjore, pay on the average, very nearly, two and half rupees, or five shillings each per annum to the State. The two millions forming the population of Rajahmundry, Masulipatam and Guntoor, pay similarly an equal sum. In the first

case, the area of taxation amounts to 3,900 square miles; in the other, it rises to nearly 17,000 miles; the sum is in the one case paid by a population amounting to 430 in the square mile, occupying a fertile, well cultivated, and well watered region, productive in the highest degree, and the payment is therefore made cheerfully, and balances in arrears are practically unknown; in the other it is paid by a population averaging not more than 130 on the square mile, poor, scattered, depressed, and the payment is therefore reluctantly made, and is a heavy burden, evaded whenever practicable, and hence much in arrears. As the population of the Kistnah and Godavery Delta rises to the standard of Tanjore under the operation of the same causes to which this standard is due, we shall have these two regions inhabited by upwards of seven millions of souls, instead of only two, as at present, and as they will be far more able than now to pay their two and half rupees each, we shall have a total revenue of one and three-quarter millions of pounds, instead of the £600,000, we now derive from them." And so in another place he says: "I leave the broad and undeniable fact, that on a maximum expenditure and cost of maintenance there are undoubted grounds for anticipating an ultimate return of from fifty to sixty per cent., to speak for itself."

It is satisfactory to know that a plan of Captain Dickens, of the Bengal Artillery, for a similar work on the Soane, is likely to afford to the Bengal Presidency a share in this admirable system, which, dating back to the second century of the Christian era, under a Native monarch, and recently prosecuted in its amended and extended form, by Colonel Cotton, to whose "natural genius for civil engineering, large acquired knowledge, singular professional daring, strong will, and perseverance," Colonel Smith bears honorable testimony,—exhibits to us an incalculable source at once of revenue, and of public and private wealth, and certainly points to a subject which at least deserves and is likely to reward Enquiry. But we forbear entering into other details. The formation of roads, the extension of railways, the navigation of our rivers, works of irrigation, the speedy establishment of a port on the Mutlah, the increase of the steam flotilla on the chief rivers, and the prosecution of the geological surveys, (already undertaken), are the principal branches of Public Works which require consideration, but having adverted to them we must hasten on to other subjects. The cultivation of tea in India, like railways, and the rivers, and like the cultivation of cotton, and irrigation, might well be made the subject of a distinct paper. We can only briefly glance at it. It has been prosecuted for some years with success in Assam, by the Assam Tea Company, but the population is scanty there, and the district is not easily

accessible. The Tea plant has recently been proved to be indigenous in the district of Sylhet in Bengal, and in the adjacent non-regulation province of Cachar. In the North West, Government plantations have been established on the Himalayas in Kumaon and Gurhwall, with remarkable promise, and in the Punjab at Kangra, with even still better results. The Kangra Tea probably is inferior to none in the world, and its cultivation presents the strongest inducement to extended enterprise. It appears that no return on capital invested can be expected under three years or perhaps four, but then it would be a reasonable calculation to expect 300 lbs. per acre, and to sell it at two shillings or one rupee a lb. At present, the Kangra Tea and the Kumaon Tea are in great request in India, at much higher prices, and the indigenous demand will probably rapidly increase, so that it will be long before there is any considerable export, either from the North West or the Punjab. The return of 300 lbs. an acre at two shillings a lb. would give £30 a year; the assessment would be very light indeed; and the invested capital, so far as the returns enable us to judge, would be comparatively low. It is difficult to see how so much as £100 an acre on any extensive plantation could be required. This then is a product which encourages the most extensive and energetic development, and it would be well, if the facts relating to it were widely known and thoroughly understood, both in Europe and America.

The exportation of Fibres has already attracted great attention, but it is probable, that the trade is still merely in its infancy. The various purposes to which Jute is now applied at home, and its cheapness, produce a great demand for it, and the ease with which it is cultivated, and the large return it yields, render it a favorite crop with the Bengali landholder. The probability is that its export will go on increasing, and that in a very few years, the quantity sent out annually, will exceed a million sterling in value. The *Rhœa* is another fibre of great importance, resembling, as it does, the China grass. The price of it at home is very high, and the want of it may increase. But till it is better known, and can be more easily prepared, the export can not be expected to be extensive. If it could be laid down in London at £50 a ton, the demand for it would soon increase, and stimulate the production here. But there are other fibres which are likely to come into general or extended use, and among these the Jubbulpore Hemp, (or sunn), and the Flax. In the former, we have a product capable of competition with the Hemp of Russia; and Flax could be exported in unlimited abundance, with a more skilful arrangement for preserving at once its stalk and its Linseed.

The trade in Opium, as the returns we have quoted shew, has grown and is likely to grow on. The question of Government connection with it is much misunderstood at home, and is sometimes argued, as though the Government here could, if it chose, suppress its cultivation by prohibitory laws. This however, we fear, is impossible, and the Government monopoly therefore, in so far as it operates as a restriction, both on the cultivation, and the use of the drug in this country, is a very important benefit. The case in China wears a very different aspect. The smuggling of Opium in armed vessels, in connivance with the Chinese officials, who are bribed and corrupted; and the consequences to myriads from the use of the drug; render the traffic only second to the slave trade, (if indeed, it be second even to that), in iniquity and cruelty. But whether it could be suppressed, save by such a combination of all nations, as is directed against the slave-trade, is very doubtful. The only practical remedy that we know in our own country, and among ourselves, is for Public Opinion to deal with these Opium traders, as it does with pests and nuisances to society, who are living by pandering to the vilest passions, and accumulating wealth, by means on which the curse of God must certainly rest for ever. But very different has been our conduct. We have boasted of our enlightenment, and of our "forbearance" to the Chinese, and have sneered at their barbarism and folly; while our Christian gentlemen, honored and exalted in society, have been using means to poison them by thousands, for filthy lucre's sake; and not a few who have called themselves Christians and Englishmen, have been parties to that atrocious system of slave dealing, which annually consigns thousands of entrapped Chinese, as hopeless slaves to Cuba, and as worse than hopeless slaves to the Peruvian Guano Islands. In truth, no offence more disgraceful than the conduct of multitudes of English traders to the people of China, has been committed in the annals of commerce. To crown all by a war on a false pretence of an insult to the British flag, and to commence it by the bombardment of a populous helpless city, is in strict keeping with much that has gone before; and his vindication of this conduct, doubtless in the eyes of his admirers, adds greatly to the fame of Lord Palmerston, and exhibits in striking colours his zeal for the dignity and honor of our country. Of course the war into which he is now rushing with so much bravado against a pitiable foe, will end as his first China war ended, in an enormous increase of smuggled Opium, or perhaps the traffic will be still further stimulated by the importation being legalized. Since the last war, the Import of Opium into China has increased from 20,000 to 70,000 chests, and this war will doubtless lead to a further corresponding

expansion of the traffic. We talk of the wrongs of Africa! When the public mind in England is restored to health, we shall begin to hear of the still greater wrongs of China.

The rapidly extending trade in Grain and Seeds, particularly in Rice, Linseed, and Mustardseed, must have attracted the attention of all who have considered the development of India's resources. The readier cultivation of these articles as compared with Sugar, and the greater profit they at present yield, cause them to be preferred to Sugar by the cultivators. The case of Indigo rests on special grounds. It is we fear ordinarily a forced cultivation. The Planter takes a Zemindary or a lease from a Zemindar, and intends to cultivate Indigo. But the question at once occurs, is the Ryot, the small holder, to cultivate what the Planter chooses, or that which he himself prefers? What is, in fact, the Ryot's tenure? Is he a yeoman holding a freehold, subject to a rent charge payable to the Zemindar, or is he a tenant at will, whose continuance in possession depends from year to year on the pleasure of his landlord, or is he a mere labourer? It is a large question, and the probable answer to it will satisfy few Indigo Planters. We apprehend that the Ryot is in the same position as the Feuar in Scotland, or the perpetual householder in Lancashire, who pays a first rent to a head landlord. The idea of the head landlord in those parts, prescribing the crops, is to say the least, novel; and we apprehend that ordinarily it is a sense of the doubtfulness of the right on the part of Indigo Planters, which induces them to rest rather on an alleged contract in each case, than on a general power as landlords. They usually make advances for the season, and supply the seed—and if this be done *bona fide*, and accepted by the tenant, the obligation to cultivate accordingly, is sufficiently simple. But there is reason to believe, that the ryot is usually allowed no choice in the matter. That there are cases in which he consents to receive an advance for Indigo cultivation, and then, under the influence of a rival Planter and Zemindar, or from the mere hope of a successful fraud, sows other seed, is very probable; and it is equally likely that in all such cases, the Planter is tempted by the dilatory and expensive process of legal relief, to take the law into his own hands, and to assert his rights, according to his own view of them, in his own way. But generally speaking, it is difficult to believe, that ryots occupying ground in a Talook or Zemindary held by an Indigo Planter, who are necessarily greatly in his power, would venture to sow other seed, if they had consented to receive advances for cultivating Indigo. It may be assumed that the Bengali, with his thirst for gain, will be sufficiently willing, without any constraint, to cultivate a profitable crop; and that there must be something

peculiar in the case of Indigo, which occasions his reluctance and repugnance; and we apprehend that as other crops—(Rice, Jute, and Seeds for instance,) become increasingly in demand, this repugnance will increase. The Indigo Planter will be then, as now, of course at liberty to sow Indigo on land in his own proper occupation, but the question, whether he is at liberty to compel the ryots in Zemindaries, which he has purchased, or in the Talooks which he holds of Zemindars, to cultivate it also, in preference to all other crops, is not to be settled in the affirmative, as a matter of course.

In dealing with this subject we are usually met by extraneous considerations. We are told of the capital expended by Planters, and of its great importance to the country, and the like. But great caution is needful in giving assent to all that is said on this point. The cultivation of Indigo originally was stimulated chiefly by the East India Company, which made very large advances on the produce. Mr. Bell states that the Exports in 1786 were 245,011 lbs.; and that it was by means of these advances that the quantity had advanced to 5,570,824 lbs. in 1810. The average amount now is probably about 9,000,000 lbs. the factories having been increased by the great Houses, and many of them having been afterwards kept up at a heavy loss by the Union Bank,—in both cases we venture to think, at the ultimate cost of the unfortunate creditors of those Houses and that Bank. The current outlay now, in the purchase of seed and in labour, is doubtless large, and the annual average export value of the article, may be henceforth stated at about two and a half millions sterling. But the export of Rice from Calcutta and Arracan last year, we believe, was much more than this, and it was raised with far less difficulty, and the profit on it to the people was vastly greater. The cultivator of Indigo knows that he is engaged in a hazardous speculation, and that it is as likely as not, at the end of the season, that the yield of his land, instead of clearing off his advances, and leaving a balance of profit, will leave him in debt to the Planter. Then, further, he is in the hands of middle men who notoriously defraud him. The number of his bundles is most probably counted amiss; and in settling accounts he has to give all kinds of “customs” into the intervening hands. He is, in fact, “in the books” of the factory, and is likely to remain there, *volens volens*, for life. On the whole then, there is a great deal in the Indigo Planting system as practised in Bengal, which demands enquiry, and which suggests difficult and embarrassing questions. That it is connected with a great deal of severity and injustice, appears very evident; and that this must *necessarily* be the case, (as is usually said), is a conclusion which in our minds, at least, does not excite either satisfaction or contentment.

At any rate, enquiry ought not to be refused from the fear of injuring "class interests," and of exciting "class animosities," if the fact be that the opposed "classes" are a few Indigo Planters on the one hand, and myriads of suffering and oppressed people on the other. Or, if this ground be tenable, it must be also conceded that all the measures preliminary to the emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies were objectionable, and that emancipation itself was unjustifiable.

Of the other articles of export, it is probable that considerable progress will be made, ere many years, in Coffee, Tobacco, Cochineal, and Borax. If disturbances increase in China, there may be a largely augmented demand for Silk. And it appears to be very likely that Wheat will assume a greater prominence in the exports of Grain, as soon as the Railroads are sufficiently advanced to reach the most fertile districts. The internal demand of India herself, for her own products and manufactures, will also rise with her advancing civilization, and the demand of her ports, of Calcutta especially, for all the materials of ship-building and of domestic luxuries, will stimulate internal traffic in an extraordinary manner. New wants will arise, the wonderful ingenuity of the people, applied to improve methods of cultivation, and to new arts, will develop new internal resources, and great tracts of country, now the abode of wild beasts, will be cleared, and brought under culture, and the climate being improved, as well as the popular habits, the people may advance in physical vigour and courage.

But the consideration of India's future progress cannot be severed from the thought of the destiny of the whole continent of Asia. The voice of prophecy, the experience of history, the observation of nature, all combine to point to this great continent, as the sphere of the greatest future developement of power, wealth, and knowledge. With such a vast population, with such exuberant fertility, with such magnificent rivers, such mineral treasures, and seas studded with such splendid islands; with races of people marked out for eminence by the highest natural gifts; with new influences rapidly working to combine, and unite under European authority, all Eastern nations; and with all those other advantages which are spreading through the globe—proximity by means of steam, the experience of varied wants and mutual dependence, the advancement of intelligence, and the spirit of enterprise and freedom,—Asia is struggling forward out of the sufferings and gloom of centuries, into the enjoyment of peace and prosperity. It may be soon, that we shall see again on the theatre of the world her master-minds; the spirit of ancient sages and heroes animating new sons of the East: the lyre touched again with the re-kindled fire of earth's first and greatest poets; patriotism burning again in a new heroic David; descendants of the Maccabees rousing desponding nations into life; and the fervour of Paul again inspir-

ing Apostles of the East to give a new impulse to their own and to future generations. We have known in the dreary page of past history, the sad records of energies wasted, wisdom mis-directed, and military skill applied only to spread abroad desolation and ruin. We see still the ascendancy of minds of astonishing force, in the followers of Mohammed, Gaudama, Zoroaster, and Confucius. We meet at every turn, traditions of Akbar, and records of the conquering march of Timour. Nimrod is remembered still. The name of Ishmael is still revered by his posterity; and the faithful memory of the scattered Jews, mourns still the fatal sins that stripped them of their land, while it treasures up the promise of pardon and future glory, and the fame of their ancient worthies. And we feel how soon, if the animating and ennobling spirit of Christianity were to vivify the powers of some new hero of Asia, the tide of sorrow and affliction might be rolled back, and years of compensating blessing begin to run! We believe that thus it will be: that assuredly the Deliverer will hasten to release this struggling captive, and to destroy the wasting foe which preys now on the weakened frame. All nature, all tradition, all human expectation, points to the coming time; and prophecy directs the eye to the source of faith and hope. Already in India much has been attempted. Brahminism has been shaken, and entrance gained for truth. In other lands the powers of evil have been shattered. And there have been the first fruits of the promised harvest in the evangelization of many, who once worshipped dumb idols even as they were led. In very recent days, we have heard of the Karens in Burmah, receiving the Gospel "with all readiness of mind," and scarcely less has been its triumph among the Coles in Central India. As we have seen in other lands, the Moravians (as in Antigua), carrying the blessings alike of Christianity, and liberty to a whole population; as we now see captured Negroes rescued and brought back to Africa, there to carry to their homes far inland, or up the Niger, the tidings which alone can truly emancipate; we awaken to the consciousness, that the era of the world's recovery is drawing near. We see the whole creation groaning in bondage; while boundless wealth, in food for the use of man, is wasted every year in untrodden regions, rich with all the needful treasures of a golden age. But we read that "the earth was formed to be inhabited," and we believe, that by ways far beyond our conception, with the ease of omnipotent skill, the designed result will be accomplished, and the designed purpose fulfilled. And therefore, though now scarcely in the infancy of the world's true manifestation, we lift up our heart, in the assurance that error, suffering, and oppression, will be gradually but completely abolished, and that all the nations will be united in

the combined response of praise and worship, to the great of their bounties and their joy.

If there be those who deem these topics uncongenial main subject, they have altogether mistaken our design in viewing these foregoing details. We wish to join with in pleading for India; in producing an intelligent in her condition; and in exhibiting her necessities and hardships. We cherish the hope that if, unhappily, merchants have fore contented themselves with visiting this land for purpose of realizing some rapid gains, the day when they will be animated by nobler sentiments, and will violence the victory over self. It is a narrow and petty fancy which limits the work of elevating the people of this land to Public Officers and Christian Ministers, or which leads any to say to another, 'I have no need of thee.' In the wise appointments of God, there is an endless diversity of gifts, affording infinite degrees of influence. To the statesman the case of India presents, we believe, at the present time, the grandest and the most hopeful sphere in the world, for the exercise of the most enlarged ability, and the most capacious and the warmest philanthropy; but not less to the merchant, who realizes his duty to "consecrate his gain to the Lord, and his substance to the Lord of the whole earth," it affords scope for the noblest liberality, and unrivalled opportunities of speedy and extensive usefulness. Hitherto, there has been little effort to do good, and little desire to gain the attachment of the people, or to deserve their gratitude; there have been few attempts to obtain acquaintance with their true condition;—all has been hurry to gain riches, and hurry to return home, un blessing and unblest. If India has been neglected, there have been few at home to claim a hearing on her behalf; fewer still who have spoken, with genuine feeling or intelligence, of her distresses. The general tone of all has been the cold and careless echo of "Am I my brother's keeper?" and it has been seldom that injustice has roused any to demand even a fair and deliberate enquiry. If now the conviction, at least, of *this* duty be spread widely abroad; if the importance of thus commencing the discharge of England's responsibility to this long neglected empire, be now recognized and admitted; we shall look at no distant day for a result surpassing all present apparent probabilities, in the improvement of the Government, in the enlightenment of the people, in the extension of commerce, and in the diffusion of Indian, and British influence, throughout the whole continent of Asia.

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